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Abstract: This paper analyses economic power, state power and ideological power in the 
age of Donald Trump with the help of critical theory. It applies the critical theory approaches 
of thinkers such as Franz Neumann, Theodor W. Adorno and Erich Fromm. It analyses 
changes of US capitalism that have together with political anxiety and demagoguery brought 
about the rise of Donald Trump. This articles draws attention to the importance of state theo-
ry for understanding Trump and the changes of politics that his rule may bring about. It is in 
this context important to see the complexity of the state, including the dynamic relationship 
between the state and the economy, the state and citizens, intra-state relations, inter-state 
relations, semiotic representations of and by the state, and ideology. Trumpism and its po-
tential impacts are theorised along these dimensions. The ideology of Trump (Trumpology) 
has played an important role not just in his business and brand strategies, but also in his 
political rise. The (pseudo-)critical mainstream media have helped making Trump and Trum-
pology by providing platforms for populist spectacles that sell as news and attract audiences. 
By Trump making news in the media, the media make Trump. An empirical analysis of 
Trump’s rhetoric and the elimination discourses in his NBC show The Apprentice underpins 
the analysis of Trumpology. The combination of Trump’s actual power and Trump as specta-
cle, showman and brand makes his government’s concrete policies fairly unpredictable. An 
important question that arises is what social scientists’ role should be in the conjuncture that 
the world is experiencing.  
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On November 8, 2016, the Republican Party nominee Donald Trump, won the US 
presidential election against the Democratic Party’s candidate Hillary Clinton. Trump 
is one of the richest Americans. According to statistics, he is the 156th richest Ameri-
can1. Clinton achieved 2 million votes more than Trump in the popular vote. Given 
the USA’s majority voting system and that Trump achieved the majority in 30 out of 
50 states, he won the election. Table 1 shows exit poll data.  
 
  
                                            
1 http://www.forbes.com/forbes-400/list, accessed on November 27, 2016.  
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Group Trump Clinton 
Men 53% 41% 
Women 54% 42% 
White 58% 37% 
Black 8% 88% 
Age 18-29 37% 55% 
Age 30-44 42% 50% 
Age 45-65 53% 44% 
Age 65+ 53% 45% 
High school education or less 51% 45% 
Postgraduate study degree 37% 58% 
Income under $30,000 41% 53% 
$30,000-$49,999 42% 51% 
$50,000-$99,999 50% 46% 
$100,000-$199,999 48% 47% 
$200,000-$249,999 49% 48% 
$250,000+ 48% 46% 
City over 50,000 35% 59% 
Suburbs 50% 45% 
Small city, rural 62% 34% 
Those who think that immigration is the most im-
portant political issue 
64% 32% 
Those who think that the US economy is in a poor 
condition 
79% 15% 
Those whose financial situation has become worse 
since 2012 
78% 19% 
Those who are angry about the federal government 90% 6% 
Table 1: Exit poll showing the share of voters who fall into a specific category (data 
source: New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/08/us/politics/election-exit-
polls.html?_r=0)  
The data indicates that the typical Donald Trump voter is an older white man, who 
lives in rural America, has a middle or upper income, low education, has fears about 
immigration and economic decline, and is angry with the government. This voting 
pattern is not a single case. The typical pro-Brexit voter lived in rural Britain, had a 
low income, low education, and was older and white (table 2). 
Trump promised radical change and opposed the political elite. He managed to 
become the projection mechanism of the discontented and those who are afraid of 
social decline. Here’s his typical characterisation of this elite: “Typical politician. All 
talk, no action. Sounds good, doesn't work. Never going to happen. Our country is 
suffering because people like Secretary Clinton have made such bad decisions in 
terms of our jobs and in terms of what's going on” (Clinton and Trump 2016a). “Final-
ly, I realized that America doesn’t need more ‘all-talk, no-action’ politicians running 
things. It needs smart businesspeople who understand how to manage. We don’t 
need more political rhetoric – we need more common sense. ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix 
it’ – but if it is broke, let’s stop talking about it and fix it. I know how to fix it “ (Trump 
2015a, 4). 
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Group % of votes in 
favour of Brexit 
Household income > £60,000 35% 
Household income < £20,000 58% 
Routine manual worker 71% 
Higher professionals 41% 
Not in paid work 59% 
Postgraduate degree 27% 
No qualifications 75% 
Age 66+ 59% 
Age 18-25 28% 
Women 50% 
Men 52% 
Black, Asian and minority ethnic 36% 
White British 52% 
Table 2: British Election Study of voters in the EU Referendum 2016 (data source: 
Goodwin and Heath 2016) 
What Trump suggests to do is to substitute the political elite by the economic elite so 
that the latter has direct influence on policy making: “[I]t's about time that this country 
had somebody running it that has an idea about money” (Clinton and Trump 2016a). 
“And if we could run our country the way I've run my company, we would have a 
country that you would be so proud of” (Clinton and Trump 2016c). “We have the 
greatest businesspeople in the world. We have to use them to negotiate our trade 
deals” (Clinton and Trump 2016c). The rise of Trump is the story of how a billionaire 
came to political power. He did not bring about a non-elitist people’s politics, but the 
rise of the capitalist class as directly ruling and dominating politics.  
This paper asks: How does the political economy of Donald Trump’s presidency 
look like? What are the economic, political and ideological factors that will determine 
the character of his presidency? What changes of the US state could Trump’s presi-
dency bring about? 
Section 2 focuses on the context of the rise of right-wing populism. In order to pre-
pare the analysis of what changes of the US state Donald Trump’s presidency 
means, section 3 discusses the concept of the state in capitalism and elaborates a 
theoretical model. Based on this model, section 4 analyses the political economy of 
the US state under Donald Trump. Section 5 gives attention to Trump and ideology. 
Section 6 draws some conclusions on how to apply critical theory for understanding 
Trump. It also asks what can be done in the political situation the world is in today. 
2. Why Did Trump Win the US Presidential Election? 
Franz Neumann (1900-1954) was a German-Jewish political scientist. After Hitler 
came to power, he first fled to England and then went on to the USA in 1936. At the 
time of the Second World, he in the years 1943-1948 worked for the Office of Strate-
gic Services. He also worked as analyst for the prosecutors in the Nuremberg Trials. 
In 1948, he became a professor of political science at Columbia University. Neu-
mann’s (2009 [1944]) book Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Social-
ism 1933–1944 has become a classic work in the analysis of authoritarianism.  
Neumann (1957) argues in his essay Anxiety and Politics that the rise of authori-
tarian politics is a combination of economic, political and psychological processes. 
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Situations of anxiety in society would in such cases result in the identification of a 
vast amount of people with a leader. Leadership ideology would come along with the 
hatred of identified enemies: “Just as the masses hope for their deliverance from dis-
tress through absolute oneness with a person, so they ascribe their distress to certain 
persons, who have brought this distress into the world through a conspiracy. The his-
torical process is personified in this manner. Hatred, resentment, dread, created by 
great upheavals, are concentrated on certain persons who are denounced as devilish 
conspirators” (279). In such situations, the “fear of social degradation […] creates for 
itself ‘a target for the discharge of the resentments arsing from damaged self-
esteem’” (287). Alienation for Neumann has psychological, socio-economic and polit-
ical dimensions.  
Collective anxiety can emerge when one or several of the following factors are 
present (Neumann 1957, 288-293): a) the alienation of labour, b) destructive compe-
tition, c) social alienation: a group fears or is threatened by the decline of “its pres-
tige, income, or even its existence” and “does not understand the historical process 
or is prevented from understanding it” (290), d) political alienation in respect to the 
political system, e) the institutionalisation of anxiety (for example in the form of a to-
talitarian movement, propaganda or terror), f) destructive psychological alienation 
and persecutory anxiety.  
Neumann summarises these aspects the following way: 
  
Neurotic, persecutory anxiety can lead to ego-surrender in the mass through af-
fective identification with a leader. This caesaristic identification is always re-
gressive, historically and psychologically. An important clue for the regressive 
character is the notion of false concreteness, the conspiracy theory of history. 
[…] The intensification of anxiety into persecutory anxiety is successful when a 
group (class, religion, race) is threatened by loss of status, without understand-
ing the process which leads to its degradation. Generally, this leads to political 
alienation, i.e., the conscious rejection of the rules of the game of a political sys-
tem. The regressive mass movement, once it has come to power must, in order 
to maintain the leader-identification, institutionalize anxiety. The three methods 
are: terror, propaganda, and, for the followers of the leader, the crime commit-
ted in common (Neumann 1957, 293-294).  
 
Neumann’s notions of crisis and authoritarianism can help us to understand the polit-
ical situation in the USA and Europe that has developed since the start of the capital-
ist crisis in 2008. A first element is the alienation of labour. Neoliberal capitalism is 
the ruling class’ struggle against everyday people that is fought via the commodifica-
tion of everything, state-support for capitalist interests, and ideology. Figures 1 and 2 
show the development of the wage share and the capital share in the USA and the 
EU. The wage share is the share of the wage sum in the GDP, the capital share the 
share of total capital in the GDP. The two variables are inversely proportional: The 
higher the capital share is, the lower is the wage share. Since the mid-1970s, the 
wage-share has dropped by around 5% in both the USA and the European Union.  
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Figure 1: The wage share’s development in the USA and the EU15 countries 
 
 
Figure 2: The capital share’s development in the USA and the EU 15 countries 
The rate of profit measures an economy’s relationship of annual profits to invest-
ments. The rate of surplus-value is the relationship of profits to wages. The organic 
composition of capital is the relationship of capital investments to wages. The rate of 
profit is directly proportional to the rate of surplus-value and indirectly proportional to 
the organic composition of capital. Figures 3 and 4 show the development of these 
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Figure 3: Macro-economic development in the USA 
 
Figure 4: Macro-economic development of the EU15 countries 
In the EU and the USA, the rate of surplus-value and the organic composition of capi-
tal have both increased since the mid-1970s. Given that the two variables contradict 
each other and exert contradictory pressures on the profit-rate, the result was that the 
profit rate fluctuated and could not reach the same levels as it had in the 1950s and 
1960s. Pressures on wages were combined with a low-tax regime. In the USA, the 
level of capital taxation decreased from 0.4% of the GDP to 0.1% in 2016 (data 
source: AMECO).   
Although capital and the capitalist state exerted downward pressure on wages, the 
rising costs for capital investments acted as a counter-tendency. This can be ob-
served by an increasing organic composition of capital. Technology investments ad-
vancing the computerisation and other innovations are capital-intensive. Capital 
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economy’s financialisation, which included the growth of high-risk financial deriva-
tives. According to estimations, the value of over-the-counter derivatives was in 2008 
US$ 600 trillion (Sundaram 2012). The world GDP was around US$ 63 trillion in 2008 
(data source: World Bank Statistics), which means that OTC derivatives amounted to 
9.5 times the value of the global GDP. In many countries, the squeeze of wages re-
sulted in large increases of personal debt: In the USA, the share of loans in the GDP 
increased from 63.0% in 1995 to 93.5% in 2008 (data source: Fuchs 2017b, table 
10.1). In the UK, there was an increase from 64.0% to 93.3% during the same time 
period (data source: Fuchs 2017b, table 10.1). Also inequality rose massively. In 
1979, the richest 0.1 percent owned 7 percent of the total US wealth, whereas in 
2016 this share had increased to 22 percent (Sanders 2016b, 207). In 2008, the US 
housing market’s financial bubble burst, which triggered a major economic crisis. 
Given that financial markets are global and networked, the crisis spread and took on 
an international dimension.  
A second factor was that international competition of transnational corporations 
brought about capital export and de-industrialisation in the West. In 2008, capital ex-
port (measured as foreign direct investment outward flows) accounted for 2.74% of 
world GDP2. The OECD countries accounted for 81.9% of these exports. The EU 
(43.6%) and the USA (19.0%) were the largest exporters of capital. 53.9% of all FDI 
flows went to OECD countries, including 19.7% to the USA (19.7%) and 20.1% to the 
EU (20.1%). Other important destinations for capital exports were China (10.9%), 
Russia (4.8%), Canada (3.9%), Australia (2.97%), Brazil (2.87%), India (2.76%), and 
Saudi Arabia (2.51%).  
In 2015, the share of capital export in world GDP had decreased to 2.2% (-0.5% 
since 2008). Whereas the US’s share increased from 19.0% in 2008 to 20.1% in 
2015, the EU’s share decreased from 43.6% to 33.3%. China’s share increased from 
3.3% to 11.7%. What is also significant is that the total volume of capital export de-
creased from US$ 1.4 trillion in 2008 to 1.2 trillion in 2015. The US’s total volume of 
FDI outflows during this period shrank from 329.1 billion to 322.5 billion. The EU’s 
total volume went from 752.4 billion down to 532.5 billion. These data provide indica-
tions that capitalism has to a significant degree de-globalised since the start of the 
capitalist crisis in 2008. Capitalism is still to a significant degree global capitalism, but 
there is a tendency that the annual increase of capital export is absolutely shrinking 
and slowing down relatively.  
Social alienation has constituted a third factor. Given a more unequal world, many 
people fear a decline of their social status. The share of those US-citizens, who indi-
cated in the World Values Survey that they are rather or completely dissatisfied with 
the financial situation of their household increased from 29.7% in 2000 to 36.9% in 
20103. Politics in Europe and North America reacted to the world economic crisis not 
by questioning, but by intensifying neoliberal governmentality: States bailed out 
banks and corporations with tax-payers money and implemented hyper-neoliberal 
austerity measures that focused on cutting expenditures for the welfare state. The 
bailout as such is a state-interventionist and therefore state-capitalist measure, in 
which the state mobilises public money in order to pay for the debt of private corpora-
tions. So this form of state-capitalist intervention turns public into private money. In 
2015, the European Union under German leadership answered to the election of the 
                                            
2 Source for all FDI data: OECD statistics, source for world GDP data: World Bank Statistics 
3 Data source: World Values Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org: This item was 
measured with a Likert-scale ranging from 1 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satis-
fied). We report the sum of those whose score ranges between 1 to 5.  
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left-wing Syriza government in Greece with brutal financial repression. In summer 
2015, it put a gun on the Greek government’s head, saying, “Implement more neolib-
eral austerity measures or we will shoot and kill your banking system and your econ-
omy”. Up until today, the EU, driven by German financial interests, refuses a haircut 
of Greece’s debt. Greece’s debt is the result of the combination of Europe’s core-
periphery structure and Greek neoliberalism (Laskos and Tsakalotos 2013). 
Given the decades-long persistence of politics that advance capitalist interests and 
squeeze everyday citizens, it is no wonder that the latter as a fourth factor feel politi-
cally alienated from the political system, political parties and politicians. Whereas in 
1960, the voter turnout in the US presidential election was 62.8% of the voting-age 
population, it was less than 54% in 20164. The average turnout in EU parliamentary 
elections decreased from 62.0% in 1979 to 42.6% in 20145. These are indications 
that citizens feel that the political system does not represent their interests. Confi-
dence into the political systems seems to be in general low: In the World Values Sur-
vey (2010-2014 wave), 85.3% of the US participants indicated that they have low or 
no confidence in political parties6. 65.3% indicated they had low or no confidence in 
the government. In an earlier wave of this survey (2005-2009), 63.6% of the UK par-
ticipants expressed low or no trust in the government and 76.9% in political parties.  
The fifth factor is the institutionalisation of anxiety: Especially since the capitalist 
crisis started, far right populists like Donald Trump in the USA, Nigel Farage in the 
UK, Marine Le Pen in France, or Heinz Christian Strache in Austria have blamed im-
migrants and refugees and have advanced nationalist sentiments. The Austrian poli-
tician Jörg Haider was already in the 1980s a prototype of this kind of new right popu-
list politics that play with nationalism and xenophobia (Fuchs 2016a, 2016c).  
The combination of these five factors has in countries such as the UK and the 
USA resulted in an increase of nationalist and xenophobic sentiments and in the 
election of Donald Trump and the UK’s decision to leave the EU.  
79% of those who voted for “Leave” in the Brexit-referendum thought that immigra-
tion was an ill for society. 71% argued that multiculturalism is bad. The levels among 
those who voted for Britain remaining in the EU were in contrast 19% and 20% (Ash-
croft 2016). The share of “Leave” voters among those who described themselves as 
English and not British was 79% (21% “Remain” voters), whereas the share of “Re-
main” voters among those who saw their identity as British and not as English was 
60% (40% “Leave” voters). 84% of those who said in an exit poll that illegal immi-
grants working in the USA should be deported were Trump voters (Huang et al. 
2016).  
Another question that arises is how Trump’s election could transform the US state. 
For trying to give an answer, we need an understanding of what the state is.  
 
3. Theorising the State 
 
State theorist Bob Jessop (2016, 49) argues that there are four elements of the state 
(Jessop 2016, 49): the state system/apparatus, the state territory, the state popula-
tion, and state ideas. He defines the state the following way:  
 
 
                                            
4 Data sources: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/turnout.php, 
http://www.electproject.org/2016g  
5 http://www.ukpolitical.info/european-parliament-election-turnout.htm  
6 Source for all data from the World Values Survey: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org  
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The core of the state apparatus comprises a relatively united ensemble of so-
cially embedded, socially regularized, and strategically selective institutions and 
organizations [Staatsgewalt] whose socially accepted function is to define and 
enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society [Staatsvolk] 
in a given territorial area [Staatsgebiet] in the name of the common interest or 
general will of an imagined political community identified with that territory 
[Staatsidee] (Jessop 2016, 49). 
 
In comparison to Jessop’s (1990, 341) earlier definition of the state, his newer under-
standing adds a cultural dimension (the nation as imagined political community). This 
reflects Jessop’s insight that French regulation theory, an approach that he used ear-
lier (see Jessop 1990) and completely dropped in his 2016 book, does not adequate-
ly take into account culture and ideology and that a cultural political economy ap-
proach is needed (Sum and Jessop 2013, for a critique of this approach see Fuchs 
2017a; Fuchs 2015, chapter 2). By using the concept of the imagined political com-
munity, Jessop refers to Benedict Anderson’s (1991) understanding of the nation. 
Eric Hobsbawm in contrast to Anderson argues that nations and nationalism are in-
vented traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). To say that the nation and national-
ism are invented differs from the claim that the nation is an imagined political com-
munity that is so large that its citizens cannot all know each other personally and 
therefore have to imagine shared characteristics.  
Imagination has to do with creativity, which implies a positive concept of the na-
tion, whereas critical theories of nationalism stress the nation and nationalism’s ideo-
logical character. Invention resonates with fabrication, falsity, and ideology (Özkirimli 
2010, 107). One certainly must take into account that Jessop here provides a general 
definition of the state. But the question is whether in a democratic-socialist society a 
form of “civic nationalism” can exist or if not any form of nationalism always bears in 
itself the threat of genocide so that a free society must strive to overcome all national 
borders and all forms of national identity. Doubts arise whether the ideological con-
cept of the imagined community should be included in the definition of the state.  
Jessop’s general definition of the state leaves out the relationship of the state to 
the economy. Any state relies for its existence on material inputs from the economy. 
Any state’s collective decisions regulate the economy and society at large. In a capi-
talist state, these collective decisions reflect to significant degree capitalist interests. 
But given that a state is not necessarily capitalist and a class state, the relationship of 
the state to capitalism and class should not be part of the definition of the state in 
general, but only of the capitalist state and the class state. Jessop’s definition how-
ever lacks a focus on the relationship between the economic and the political system. 
If we assume that society is made up of dialectical relations of the economic, the 
political and the cultural realms (Fuchs 2008b, 2015, 2016b), where each realm is a 
realm of production and has relative autonomy, then the implication is that we need a 
definition of the state that focuses on the relationships of the state to the economy, 
politics (including self-referential relations within the state system as well as relation-
ships to other states), and culture.  
In modern society, the state regulates working conditions (labour time, wage lev-
els, holiday entitlements, safety, etc.), ownership (monopolies, intellectual property 
rights, competition policies, legal defence of property against theft, etc.), monetary 
policies (interest rate, monetary supply), trade (protectionist VS. free market), the 
level and rights of the immigrant workforce; fiscal policy (taxation, government spend-
ing) in respect to a) taxation (capital, labour) and b) state spending, borrowing and 
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investments in infrastructure; the private, public or hybrid ownership character of in-
frastructures (science and technology, schools, universities, roads, railways, bridges, 
hospitals, communications, housing, waste disposal, energy supply, water supply, 
pension system, etc.); inheritance policies, population policies (financial  support for 
families, etc.), external and internal defence (military, police, secret services, prison 
system).  
The officials, members and supporters of political parties to specific degrees rep-
resent the capitalist class, the working class, and different class fractions. The state 
is a political site, where these interests meet and contradict each other in the collec-
tive decision making process. Collective decision-making in parliaments or other po-
litical institutions is a site, where different political interests relate to each other. In 
capitalism, the state regulates the class conflict. It for example has positive or nega-
tive effects on profits and wages by taxation, minimum wage policies, and decisions 
on the public or private provision of basic services. The state’s economic policies in-
fluence the rate of profit and the rate of surplus-value. Its innovation and infrastruc-
ture policies also shape the organic composition of capital. This also means that the 
capitalist class, the working class, ideological struggles, and the state influence class 
struggles. Crises of capitalism are often triggers for the restructuring of the state and 
its policies that regulate capitalism. Politicians are also producers of collective deci-
sions who earn a wage paid for by taxation.  
Taking these reflections into account, we can define the state as an ensemble of 
institutions and organisations that produce and practice collective decisions that are 
binding for all members of society and that thereby regulate economic, political and 
cultural life within the territorial boundaries of society. State power involves certain 
relations between the economy and the state, intra-state relations between the 
state’s institutions, inter-state relations that define the relationship between states, 
semiotic representations by the state (discourses by the state), and semiotic repre-
sentations of the state (discourses on the state). Table 3 present a systematic model 
of the state. 
 
Dimension 
1) Relationship of the state to the economy 
2) The relationship of the state to the citizens 
3) Intra-state relations 
4) Inter-state relations 
5) Semiotic representations by the state (Discourses by the state) 
6) Semiotic representation of the state (Discourses on the state) 
Table 3: Dimensions of the state 
The capitalist economy is a regime of monetary capital accumulation that is based on 
class relations that define and enable the private ownership of the means of produc-
tion, the exploitation of labour, and the dominant class’s dispossession of the prod-
ucts and value that labour produces. The logic of accumulation can extend beyond 
the economy. As a consequence, modern politics and the state are systems for the 
accumulation of influence and decision-power. And modern culture is an ideological 
system for the accumulation of reputation, meaning-making- and definition-power 
(Fuchs 2017b, chapter 3). Modern society therefore not just entails a capitalist econ-
omy, but is a capitalist society. A state is capitalist to the extent that its role is that it 
supports, enables, defends, and legitimates the accumulation of economic capital, 
the accumulation of political power (at the internal level of the state via mechanisms 
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that allow elite control of politics, and at the international level of the state via imperi-
alist mechanisms that allow control of the international economy, international poli-
tics, and international ideological hegemony), and the accumulation of cultural power. 
Culture, worldviews and ideologies matter for the state in several respects:  
• The state is a site for the formulation of political positions, government pro-
grammes, and opposition programmes that express particular worldviews.  
• In political institutions, different worldviews collide, contradict each other, and 
may also temporarily align with each other.  
• Policies and political values influence and are influenced by everyday 
worldviews and ideologies and by intellectuals and lobbies that try to shape 
political programmes and positions.  
Economic reductionism sees the state as the instrument for the rule of the capitalist 
class. It overlooks that the working class can have influence on state power. Political 
reductionism sees the state as autonomous and neutral institution that depending 
and who controls it determines the economy in particular ways. A dialectical view 
sees the modern state and the modern economy as identical and non-identical. They 
are both based on the logic of accumulation (of political power and capital). The state 
is always a system of political domination; class society is always a system of exploi-
tation. The state as the site of political accumulation and domination stands in a con-
tradictory relation to the capitalist economy as the site of economic accumulation and 
exploitation.  
Given this model of the state, we can next analyse how US state power may 
change under Donald Trump. 
4. The Political Economy of the US State Under Trump’s Rule 
This section has sub-sections that reflect the state model outlined in section 3: 
4.1. The Relationship of the State to the Economy under Trump 
4.2. The Relationship of the State to its Citizens: Civil Liberties and State Institutions 
under Trump 
4.3. International Relations under Trump 
4.4. Trumpology: Ideology and the State under Trump 
Note that dimension two and three of the state model (relationship of the state to 
citizens, intra-state relations) have been combined. Both relate to the political sys-
tem’s internal organisation, focusing on a) the relationship of the state to civil society 
and b) the relationship among state institutions. The first dimension covers the rela-
tionship of the state to the economy. The model’s fifth and sixth dimension focus on 
the relationship of the state to culture and have also been combined. The cultural-
ideological dimension analyses ideological representations by the state and of the 
state in the age of Trump.   
4.1. The Relationship of the State to the Economy under Trump 
The state regulates the capitalist economy, depends on it, and at the same time has 
relative autonomy from it. The tightness or looseness of the coupling between the 
capitalist economy and the state depends on specific political, cultural and ideological 
conditions and the temporary results of social conflicts and struggles. “[S]tate power 
is capitalist to the extent that it creates, maintains or restores the conditions required 
for capital accumulation in a given circumstances and is non-capitalist to the extent 
that these conditions are not realized” (Jessop 1990, 117). The political elite can at 
certain times operate relatively autonomously from the capitalist class’s influence and 
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shape the development of the capitalist economy, especially if there is a socialist 
government. 
Jessop (1990, 150) assumes that there is an “institutional separation of the eco-
nomic and political” so that one “cannot reduce state power to questions of the class 
background, affiliation or sympathies of the state elite”. “The separation of the eco-
nomic and the political orders excludes an immediate isomorphism between econom-
ic class relations and relations among political categories. Indeed the legitimacy of 
the modern state would disappear if the state unequivocally served the immediate 
economic interests of the dominant class(es)” (Jessop 2016, 102). The question is 
whether this relation is changing under Trump. 
The tradition of state theory that Jessop represents assumes that the economy 
and politics are relatively separate and autonomous. The theory of state monopoly 
capitalism (Stamocap) in contrast takes a more traditional approach, in which the 
economy largely determines the political system. It defines the state as a foundation-
al structure and the mode of functioning of modern capitalist society. Key characteris-
tics of state monopoly capitalism are:  
• “a high degree of concentration, centralisation and monopolisation of pri-
vate capital;  
• the bourgeois state’s steady and extensive presence and intervention into 
the economic reproduction process;  
• significant influence of the leading monopolies on state policies regulating 
the economy and other realms of society” (Huffschmid 1990, 758).  
“By the interlocking of and relations between the state and corporations and influ-
ences by the latter on the first, the leading corporations’ interests influence and 
shape state politics to a great degree” (Huffschmid 2010, 148). This influence would 
take on the form of corporate lobbying; the strategic role of corporations in cities, re-
gions and countries; and the exchange of personnel between the state and corpora-
tions, i.e. between political and economic elites. Stamocap theories assume that the 
state acts on behalf of capitalist monopolies’ interests and that the class affiliations of 
the state’s officials are key. State officials would be political representatives of mo-
nopoly capital’s interests. In state monopoly capitalism, there would be heavy state 
intervention (including nationalisation) to support monopolies because the profit rate 
would tend to fall,  
One problem of many Stamocap theories is that they assume that state monopoly 
capitalism results in the breakdown of capitalism and the transition to socialism. Paul 
Boccara (1982) stresses in this context the role of state intervention, the nationalisa-
tion of industries, new transport and communication technologies, intellectual labour, 
cybernetics, and automation. He argues that in the state monopoly stage, capitalism 
reaches the “uttermost limit” of its decay. “Collective ownership and the socialist plan 
become immediately necessary for economic practice” (103, translation from Ger-
man). We of course know today that state capitalism and the information economy 
have not given rise to a post-capitalist society. Rather state monopoly capitalism was 
followed by yet another stage of capitalist development, namely neoliberal capitalism.  
Jörg Huffschmid (2010, 149-151), who in the 1960s and 1970s was one of West 
Germany’s leading Stamocap theorists, argues that Stamocap theories overlook that 
also small and medium sized companies can play an important role in capitalism’s 
development, that capital’s interests and the state are contradictory, that the interna-
tionalisation of capital poses challenges for Stamocap theories, and that the envi-
ronmental crisis and patriarchy cannot be reduced to the role of monopolies in capi-
talism. 
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Stamocap theories have been criticised for reducing the state to an instrument of 
the monopoly bourgeoisie and for thereby advancing an economic-reductionist and 
monolithic approach that overlooks that the state is itself a realm, in which conflicts 
between classes and class factions are politically fought out and condensed into 
temporary, fragile unity and alliances (Hirsch, Kannankulam and Wissel 2015). 
The approaches of Antonio Gramsci, Nicos Poulantzas and other materialist theo-
ries of the state assume in contrast a relative autonomy of the state and capitalism. 
The question, however, arises in this context how the phenomenon of Donald Trump 
can be explained based on the assumption of relative autonomy, as his victory in the 
US presidential election seems to be indicative for a temporary close coupling and 
overlap of the US’s economic and the political system. Whereas state monopoly capi-
talism cannot explain the state’s relative autonomy from capital in other situations, 
relative autonomy theories cannot well explain Donald Trump. 
Stamocap theories tend to assume that the capitalist economy and the capitalist 
state interlock and interact functionally, institutionally and in respect to personnel. It 
tends to, however, stress that both realms remain separate because otherwise the 
orthodox assumption that the economic base determines the political and ideological 
superstructure cannot be upheld (see IMSF 1981, 226-244). Interlocking and interac-
tion would take place in the form of committees, boards, lobbying organisations, in-
dustry associations, consultancies, bourgeois academia and science, bourgeois me-
dia, research groups, working groups, etc. (IMSF 1981, 257-276). The state’s leading 
group of career politicians would have specific career paths separate from the ones 
of the capitalist class. The contact between the two would take on the form of “work-
ing groups, contact groups, research groups” and institutions (IMSF 1981, 274). 
 Relative autonomy theories and Stamocap theories cannot adequately explain the 
fact that Donald Trump is both a capitalist, who is among the richest Americans, and 
US president. There is a direct overlap between monopoly capital and the state in the 
form of one person, who is among the most powerful capitalists and has become the 
world’s most powerful politician. Trump is not a career politician, but a politician-
turned-capitalist, who fuses economic and political interests in one person. Trump 
says in this context: “I am the richest presidential candidate in history. I’m the only 
billionaire ever to run” (Trump 2015a, 148).  
There is always a dialectic of the state and the economy in capitalism, but this re-
lationship involves a specific power distribution that is dynamic and can shift histori-
cally. Franz Neumann (1957, 12) argues in this context that politics and the economy 
are always dialectically interconnected: “Economics is as much an instrument of poli-
tics as politics is a tool of economics”. The specific relation between the two realms 
depends on society’s historical context (Neumann 1957, 14). So for example in Nazi 
Germany, there was the primacy of the state over the economy. In the Keynesian 
state, there is an interaction of two poles of power. In the neo-liberal state, there is a 
primacy of the economy over the state via structural mechanisms. In the Trump state, 
there may be a primacy of the economy over the state via a politician-turned-
capitalist. 
Keynesian capitalism as a democratic form of state-monopoly capitalism ruled in 
Western capitalist societies until the 1970s and was then gradually supplanted by 
neo-liberal capitalism that privatised state-owned industries and reduced the level of 
state intervention into specific parts of the economy. The rise of neoliberal capitalism 
stood in the context of the crisis of Fordism and the crisis of the Keynesian state. Two 
important changes that the emergence of neoliberal capitalism brought about were 
the privatisation of state-owned industries and the internationalisation of capitalism 
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that brought about competition states. The role of finance capital and new technology 
capital increased. The role of classical industry in capitalism was reduced. The role of 
the capitalist state shifted in light of these transformations. States compete for dereg-
ulating the welfare state and social protection in order to attract capital. This does, 
however, not mean that state power has been weakened. It has merely been trans-
formed and changed its role. Capital’s structural and indirect influence as collective 
political actor on the state has been strengthened. In neoliberal capitalism, state poli-
tics primarily focus on a) the politics of privatisation, deregulation, market liberalisa-
tion, low-tax- and free trade-policies in order to enable commodification; b) the poli-
tics of militarisation and securitisation in order to exert international and national con-
trol that protects the overall political-economic system. 
Yet another shift of the role of the state was indicated by the bailout of banks and 
corporations in the course of the capitalist crisis that started in 2008. Nation states 
strongly intervened into the economy by saving crisis-struck finance capital and capi-
tal in the car industry with taxpayers’ money. Results of this interventionist move 
were hyper-neoliberal austerity politics that hit the poorest and weakest in society 
and further advanced inequalities.  
There is certainly always an institutional separation of the capitalist state and the 
capitalist economy, which means that both systems have different organisations, 
logics, rules, and structures. However, at times there can be direct overlap of per-
sonnel so that capitalists become part of the ruling political elite. Donald Trump as 
US president constitutes an important transition so that there is a key personnel over-
lap between the capitalist class and the political elite. With the rise of Donald Trump 
to the USA’s head of state, there is now a much more direct influence of the capitalist 
class on political power because there is an overlap of personnel in the form of the 
President, who is also a billionaire capitalist.  
John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney (2012) explain the rise of multina-
tional corporations with capital’s attempt to overcome long-term economic stagnation 
and to attain global monopoly profits. Multinationals aim to drive down the wage 
share globally and increase their profits by installing a system of global competition 
among workers. The consequence is a worldwide increase in the rate of exploitation 
that Foster and McChesney, drawing on Stephen Hymer’s work, call a “strategy of 
divide and rule“ (Foster and McChesney 2012, 114-115, 119). Foster (2006, 11) ar-
gues that monopoly-finance capitalism is a “new phase” of capitalist development. He 
explains its genesis: 
 
At the brink of the twentieth century, capitalism underwent a major transfor-
mation, marked by the rise of the giant corporation. The early decades that fol-
lowed were dominated by world wars and a depression associated with this 
great transformation. Following the Second World War the new stage of capital-
ism was fully consolidated, particularly within the United States, the most ad-
vanced capitalist economy. The result was a situation in which a handful of gi-
ant corporations controlled most industries (Foster 2006, 2). 
 
Financialization can be defined as the shift in the center of gravity of the capital-
ist economy, from production to finance. [...] Growth of finance relative to the 
real economy also meant the appearance of financial bubbles that threatened to 
burst. [...] Economic power was shifting from corporate boardrooms to financial 
institutions and markets, affecting the entire capitalist world economy in com-
plex ways, through a process of financial globalization. [...] The growing role of 
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finance was evident not just in the expansion of financial corporations but also 
in the growth of the financial subsidiaries and activities of non-financial corpora-
tions, so that the distinction between the financial and non-financial corpora-
tions, while still significant, became increasingly blurred. Financialization in the 
1980s and ‘90s was the main new force in the much longer-term globalization 
process, and was the defining element in the whole era of neoliberal economic 
policy (Foster 2010, 5-6). 
 
This ballooning of finance produced new outlets for surplus in the finance, in-
surances, and real estate (FIRE) sector of GDP in the form of new investment in 
buildings, office equipment, etc. Nevertheless, the great bulk of the money capi-
tal devoted to finance was used for speculation in securities, real estate, and 
commodities markets rather than for investment in capital goods, and thus did 
not feed into the growth of GDP, which continued to stagnate (Foster 2006, 4-
5). 
 
Company Name Minimum Value Company and Revenue Type 
40 Wall Street LLC $50,000,000.00 Commercial real estate, rent 
401 North Wabash Venture LLC $50,000,000.00 Residential and commercial real estate, rent, condo 
sales 
OJT Operations  $50,000,000.00 Aircraft, rent 
Fifty-Seventh Street Associates LLC  $50,000,000.00 Real estate, rent 
Trump National Golf Club – Jupiter  $50,000,000.00 Golf club 
Trump National Golf Club – Bedminster   $50,000,000.00 Golf club 
Mar-a-Lago Club, L.L.C.  $50,000,000.00 Resort 
Trump Turnberry   $50,000,000.00 Golf courses and resort  
The Trump Corporation   $50,000,000.00 Management company 
Trump National Doral $50,000,000.00 Golf courses & resort  
Trump International Golf Links – Scotland  $50,000,000.00 Golf course  
Trump International Hotels Management 
LLC  
$50,000,000.00 Management company 
Trump National Golf Club – Colts Neck  $50,000,000.00 Golf club 
Trump National Golf Club – Westchester   $50,000,000.00 Golf club 
Trump National Golf Club – Washington DC $50,000,000.00 Golf club 
Trump Old Post Office LLC $50,000,000.00 Hotel 
Trump Park Avenue LLC  $50,000,000.00 Residential & commercial real estate: Rent, condo 
sales 
Trump Ruffin Tower I LLC  $50,000,000.00 Commercial real estate, condo sales, hotel related 
revenue 
Trump Tower Commercial LLC  $50,000,000.00 Commercial real estate, rent 
Trump National Golf Club – Los Angeles  $50,000,000.00 Golf course and unsold lots, golf related revenue 
land sales 
HWA 555 Owners, LLC  $50,000,000.00 Commercial real estate, rent 
1290 Avenue of the Americas.  $50,000,000.00 Commercial real estate, rent 
Trump Tower Triplex  $50,000,000.00 Residential real estate 
Total: > $1,150,000,000.00  
Table 4: Donald Trump’s companies that have a value of at least US$ 50 million (Da-
ta source: Donald Trump Executive Branch Personnel Public Financial Disclosure 
Report, OGE Form 278e, date: May 16, 2016) 
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For reflecting on how US capitalism may change under Trump, we need to better un-
derstand Trump’s economic empire. According to the Forbes list of the world’s bil-
lionaires, Trump was in 2016 with an estimated wealth of US$ 4.5 billion the 324th 
richest billionaire7. Measuring the exact extent of Trump’s wealth has been a matter 
of controversy (O’Brien 2016).  
The Trump Organization builds, owns and operates real estate, towers and sky-
scrapers, hotels, golf courses, casinos, residential towers; luxury-, entertainment- and 
leisure-resorts. Trump also owns Trump Productions LLC that produces the reality 
TV show The Apprentice that Donald Trump hosted from 2004 until 2015. Table 4 
shows, according to a financial disclosure statement, Trump’s ownership involvement 
in companies with a value larger than US$ 50 million around the time he ran for US 
president.  
Table 5 shows according to a 2016 financial disclosure examples of industries with 
which Donald Trump’s economic activities interlocked via investments and share 
ownership. Industries outside his core economic area of real estate and entertain-
ment into which he has invested, include for example finance, natural resource ex-
traction, utilities, transport, health, biotechnology, food, retail, telecommunications, or 
Internet.  
 
Industry Example Companies 
Agricultural products and services Agrium  
Clothing Nike, VF Corporation 
Computer hardware and software Apple, Cisco, General Electric, Intuit, Microsoft 
Defence Raytheon 
Electronic instruments  Ametek, Parker Hannifin, Roper Technologies 
Finance Advantage Advisers Xanthus Fund, AG Eleven Partners LP, 
Ameriprise Financial, Baron Growth Fund, Baron Partners 
Fund, Baron Real Estate Fund, BlackRock, Caterpillar, 
Citigroup, Deutsche Money Market Series, Deutsche X-
trackers MSCI Hedged Equity, Discover Financial Services, 
General Electric, Invesco European Grow, JPMorgan Chase, 
MidOcean, Paulson & Co, Prudential Financial, Swiss Re, 
Vanguard, Visa, Wells Fargo 
Food and consumer products Ecolab, Kraft Heinz, Mead Johnson, PepsiCo, Procter & Gam-
ble, Sealed Air, WhiteWave Foods 
Health and biotechnology Ecolab, General Electric, Gilead Sciences, Hospital Corpora-
tion of America, Johnson & Johnson, McKesson Corporation, 
Merck & Co, Pfizer, Thermo Fisher Scientific 
Media content Comcast, Twenty First Century Fox 
Natural resource extraction and 
sale, utilities 
American Water Works, bhpbilliton, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, 
EOG Resources, Exxon Mobil, Freeport-McMoRan, General 
Electric, Halliburton, NextEra Energy, Phillips 66, Royal Dutch 
Shell, Schlumberger, Total S.A., Valero Energy 
Pulp and paper International Paper 
Retail and wholesale Costoco Wholesale, Home Depot, L Brands Inc, TJX, Walmart 
Storage Extra Space Storage 
Telecommunications and Internet 
infrastructure 
AT&T, CenturyLink, Comcast, Crown Castle, General Electric, 
Telenor, Verizon Communications 
Transport Boeing, Borg Warner, Caterpillar, Norfolk Southern Railway 
Table 5: Donald Trump’s connections to other industries and companies via share-
holding  (Data source: Donald Trump Executive Branch Personnel Public Financial 
Disclosure Report, OGE Form 278e, date: May 16, 2016) 
                                            
7 http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/, accessed on November 28, 2016. 
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Given the Trump empire’s interlocking with core sectors of US capitalism, it is inter-
esting to have a look at how Trump stands on policies that affect these industries. 
4.1.1. Infrastructure 
Trump’s campaign said that he wants to start a massive project for the construction 
of infrastructure. “Our airport, bridges, water tunnels, power grids, rail system – our 
nation’s entire infrastructure – is crumbling, and we aren’t doing anything about it” 
(Trump 2015a, 120). The programme includes to: 
• “Create thousands of new jobs in construction, steel manufacturing, and other 
sectors to build the transportation, water, telecommunications and energy in-
frastructure needed to enable new economic development in the U.S., all of 
which will generate new tax revenues. 
• Put American steel made by American workers into the backbone of America’s 
infrastructure. 
• Leverage new revenues and work with financing authorities, public-private 
partnerships, and other prudent funding opportunities”8 
So the idea is that the state invests into the construction of infrastructure. But given 
that taxpayers’ money will be used, it is not obvious in this plan that this will be pub-
licly owned infrastructure. It rather seems that fostering public-private partnerships 
could mean that the state pays for infrastructure projects that are carried out by pri-
vate companies that then also own this infrastructure. So it could very well turn out 
that the state is neither the employer of infrastructure workers nor the owner of newly 
built infrastructures, but only the financer, which basically means the tax-funded crea-
tion of profits and private property. The very question that arises is whether in the 
case where taxpayers’ money is used for investments, the created resources should 
be owned publicly or privately. Such projects clearly benefit the real estate industry 
that Trump comes from. 
4.1.2. Labour 
Trump appointed Andrew F. Puzder as secretary of labour. Puzder is the CEO of 
CKE Restaurants that owns the fast food chains Carl’s Jr., Hardee’s, Green Burrito 
and Red Burrito. Fast food jobs tend not to be very well paid, which is why the de-
mand for a living wage of US$ 15 per hour has especially arisen in this industry. Cali-
fornia has passed a law to increase the minimum wage to US$ 15 until 2022. Puzder 
opposes such an increase (Hiltzik 2016). 
In 2014, Puzder spoke out against minimum wage increases from US$ 7.25 to 
US$ 10.10: 
 
Unfortunately, this 40% minimum-wage hike would also reduce employment 
opportunities for those who need them most. […] Let’s examine how it would af-
fect a restaurant franchisee, a typical small business owner attempting to run a 
profitable enterprise. My company, CKE Restaurants, has more than 200 fran-
chisees running about 2,000 restaurants nationwide. Our typical franchised res-
taurant employs 25 people and earns about $100,000 a year in pretax profit – 
about 8% of the restaurant’s $1.2 million annual sales. […] But here’s what 
middle-class business owners, who live in the real world, will do when faced 
with a 40% increase in labor costs. They will cut jobs and rely more on technol-
ogy. Such changes are already happening in banks, gas stations, grocery 
                                            
8 https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/an-americas-infrastructure-first-plan/  
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stores, airports and, more recently, restaurants. Almost every restaurant chain 
in the country from Applebee’s to McDonald’s is testing or already implementing 
automated ordering with tablets or kiosks. The only other option is to raise pric-
es. Yet it would be near-impossible to increase prices enough to offset the wage 
hike, particularly given today’s economic conditions (Puzder 2014). 
 
When wages increase, Puzder only sees two possible responses by companies, 
namely that they either increase prices or try to enforce automation in order to lay off 
workers. The point is that he leaves out the option that companies accept lower profit 
rates. This does not seem to be an option for Puzder because he represents the in-
terest of capital and not of labour. It is quite likely that a businessman as secretary of 
labour will do anything to keep minimum wages low, to limit their increase and to limit 
the power of workers. A law taxing machinery that comes along with minimum wage 
increases could easily secure avoiding wage-increase-based incentives for automa-
tion. In the light of Puzder’s appointment, it seems likely that Trump’s goal of keeping 
capital in and attracting capital to the USA is not a project that is concerned about 
good earnings for workers, but is all about growing corporations’ profits.  
Given that fast food jobs are highly alienated labour, automating these activities 
should not automatically be dismissed. The point is that well paid skilled jobs are 
needed. But the USA’s elitist higher education system plunges young people and 
their parents into debt. Neoliberal capitalism enforces low paid, precarious labour. 
Progressive forms of automation must therefore stand in the context of discussions 
about how to secure a good life for all, for example in the form of a basic income 
guarantee that is funded out of capital taxation (Fuchs 2008a). 
4.1.3. Healthcare 
Trump opposes Obama’s health reform and wants to advance what he terms con-
sumer-driven healthcare. “Bad health care at the most expensive price. We have to 
repeal and replace Obamacare” (Clinton and Trump 2016c). “We want competition. 
You will have the finest health care plan there is” (Clinton and Trump 2016b). 
Trump’s plan includes to: 
 
• “Repeal and replace Obamacare with Health Savings Accounts (HSAs). […] 
• Allow people to purchase insurance across state lines, in all 50 states, creat-
ing a dynamic market. […] 
• President Obama said his health plan would cut the cost of family premiums 
by up to $2,500 a year. Instead, premiums have gone up by almost $5,000 
since Obamacare passed. […] 
• Premiums have skyrocketed across the nation, with a national average of 
almost 25%, with some states experiencing rate increases up to 70%. […] 
• People are going without needed medical care because they can’t afford the-
se amounts“9. 
 
The argument that capitalist competition makes things cheaper is not automatically 
true, as the privatisation of railways in the United Kingdom and of telecommunica-
tions in the EU shows. Capitalism has an inherent monopoly tendency so that for-
profit orientation and competitive markets tend to result in oligopolies and monopo-
lies. If there is a private health insurance market, then the goal of the involved com-
                                            
9 https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/health-care/  
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panies is to maximise profits. The way to do this is to aim at keeping the number and 
level of insurance claims low. Michael Moore’s (2007) film Sicko illustrates that privat-
ised health care can result in health insurances’ denials to cover costs. If health in-
surance in contrast is a public service funded out of contributions paid in by employ-
ees and employers, then the logic of insurance denial can more easily be avoided. 
Only a public health system can guarantee universal coverage and access. A private 
for-profit system puts patients at the whims of private insurances that want to in-
crease their profits.  
Trump’s interest in fostering private health care may not just result from the fact 
that he as shareholder had himself business interests in this industry, but it may very 
well come from a general ideological conviction that health and other social services 
should be organised as capitalist businesses that accumulate capital.  
4.1.4. Climate and the Environment 
 
 1996 2007 2016 
Share of the top 500 
companies’ revenues in 
the US-GDP 
57.9% 68.4% 65.4% 
Largest industry’s share 
in the Fortune 500 com-
panies’ total profits  
Finance 25.2% Finance 29.4% Information, communication & 
computing 27.3% 
2nd largest industry’s 
share 
Energy 13.7% Energy 18.8% Finance 26.8% 
3rd largest industry’s 
share 




Health, pharmaceuticals & bio-
tech 14.2% 














Food 5.7% Food 8.6% 
Share of hotel, restau-
rant & leisure industry 
0.6% 1.3% 1.8% 
Share of engineering & 
construction industry 
-0.2% 0.9% 0.6% 
Share of real estates 
industry 
0% 0.2% 0.5% 
Table 6: Share of the 500 largest companies’ revenues in the USA’s GDP, share of 
specific industries’ profits in the total profits of the USA’s 500 largest companies (data 
sources: Fortune US 500 [revenues, profits], various years; OECD Stat & BEA 
[GDP]) 
Table 6 shows the development of the share of the 500 largest US companies in the 
countries total GDP. Given that the share has increased from 57.9% in 1996 to 
65.4% in 2016, we can say that American capitalism has become more monopolistic. 
The data show that the information, finance, health/pharmaceuticals/biotech, 
transport, food and energy industries form US capitalism’s key sectors. It may there-
fore not be an accident, but a business strategy that Donald Trump has exactly in-
vested in these sectors. 
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According to the data used in table 6, the US energy industry made massive losses 
in 2016. The combined loss of the largest energy companies was US$ 44.4 billon. 
These included companies such as Apache (US$ -23.1 billion), Chesapeake Energy 
(-14.7 bn), Devon Energy (-14.5 bn), Freeport-McMoRan (-12.2 bn), Occidental Pe-
troleum (-7.8 bn), Anadarko Petroleum (-6,7 bn), NRG Energy (-6.4 bn), Energy Fu-
ture Holdings (-5.3 bn), EOG Resources (-4.5 bn), ConocoPhillips (-4.4bn), Hess (-
3.1 bn), Marathon Oil (-2.2 bn), Baker Hughes (-2.0 bn), or Peabody Energy (-2.0 
bn). 
The Wall Street Journal observed: “Low fuel prices and new climate policies are 
rapidly transforming the American energy sector, while escalating wars in the Middle 
East and a nuclear deal with Iran are clouding the global oil picture. […] What’s hard-
er to develop is the political consensus to transition to pricing carbon emissions. 
Right now, climate policy is being implemented piecemeal around the world. That, 
combined with current low oil and gas prices, has increased the investment risk as-
sociated with future energy production” (Cook 2015). 
Trump’s says he favours oil and coal in energy politics over alternative forms of 
energy:  
 
We invested in a solar company, our country. That was a disaster. They lost 
plenty of money on that one. Now, look, I'm a great believer in all forms of ener-
gy, but we're putting a lot of people out of work. Our energy policies are a disas-
ter. Our country is losing so much in terms of energy, in terms of paying off our 
debt. You can't do what you're looking to do with $20 trillion in debt. […] There 
has been a big push to develop alternative forms of energy – so-called green 
energy – from renewable sources. That's a big mistake. To begin with, the 
whole push for renewable energy is being driven by the wrong motivation, the 
mistaken belief that global climate change is being caused by carbon emis-
sions. If you don't buy that – and I don't – then what we have is really just an 
expensive way of making the tree-huggers feel good about themselves. […] Un-
til we get this country's lifeblood – oil – back down to reasonable rates, Ameri-
ca's economy will continue to slump, jobs won't get created, and American con-
sumers will face ever-increasing prices10. 
 
Our first priorities need to be approving the Keystone XL Pipeline and starting to 
drill everywhere oil is accessible. There has been a big push to develop alterna-
tive forms of energy – so-called green energy – from renewable sources. That’s 
another big mistake. To begin with, the whole push for renewable energy is be-
ing driven by the wrong motivation, the mistaken belief that global climate 
change is being caused by carbon emissions. If you don’t buy that – and I don’t 
– then what we have is really just an expensive way of making the tree-huggers 
feel good about themselves (Trump 2015a, 65). 
 
On November 6, 2012, Trump voiced climate change scepticism on Twitter: “The 
concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. 
manufacturing non-competitive”. His election campaign announced that it wants to 
“[u]nleash America’s $50 trillion in untapped shale, oil, and natural gas reserves, plus 
hundreds of years in clean coal reserves”11. He made it clear that he favours not just 
                                            
10 http://www.ontheissues.org/2016/Donald_Trump_Energy_+_Oil.htm   
11 https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/energy/  
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oil, but also coal: “[E]nergy is under siege by the Obama administration. […] we need 
much more than wind and solar. […] Hillary Clinton wants to put all the miners out of 
business. There is a thing called clean coal. Coal will last for 1,000 years in this coun-
try. Now we have natural gas and so many other things because of technology. […] I 
will bring our energy companies back. They'll be able to compete. They'll make mon-
ey. They'll pay off our national debt. They'll pay off our tremendous budget deficits, 
which are tremendous” (Clinton and Trump 2016b).  
After the election, Tump said in a New York Times interview about climate change: 
“I have an open mind to it. We’re going to look very carefully. It’s one issue that’s 
interesting because there are few things where there’s more division than climate 
change. […] I think there is some connectivity [between human activity and climate 
change]. There is some, something. It depends on how much. It also depends on 
how much it’s going to cost our companies. You have to understand, our companies 
are noncompetitive right now” (Trump 2016b) 
Trump in general favours deregulation. “The misguided passion of environmental-
ists today makes building anything much more difficult. Now we have crazy overregu-
lation. You can barely buy a paper clip without being in violation of some governmen-
tal policy” (Trump 2015a, 82). Trump appointed Scott Pruitt as head of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency. The New York Times argues that Pruitt as Oklahoma at-
torney general worked “with some of the largest oil and gas companies, and the 
state’s coal-burning electric utility, to try to overturn a large part of the Obama admin-
istration’s regulations on air emissions, water pollution and endangered animals“ 
(Davenport and Lipton 2016). Pruitt and Strange (2016) say about climate change: 
“Scientists continue to disagree about the degree and extent of global warming and 
its connection to the actions of mankind. That debate should be encouraged”.  
Trump’s focus on the oil industry may not just result from the fact that he as 
shareholder had himself business interests in this industry, but it may very well come 
from a general ideological belief that the oil industry is needed as US capitalism’s 
driver. Given his opposition to green energy, it could very well be that Trump’s envi-
ronmental policies will foster an increase of carbon dioxide emissions and environ-
mental pollution.  
4.1.5. Taxation 
Trump promises low taxes for corporations: “The Trump Plan will lower the business 
tax rate from 35 percent to 15 percent, and eliminate the corporate alternative mini-
mum tax. This rate is available to all businesses, both small and large, that want to 
retain the profits within the business”12. He speaks of creating “the lowest tax rates 
since before World War II” (Trump 2015a, 153). No “business of any size will pay […] 
more than 15 percent of their business income in taxes” (Trump 2015a, 153). There 
will “be only four [tax] brackets: 0%, 10%, 20%, and 25%” (153). What one must note 
in this context is that when Trump came to power in 2016, the highest tax bracket 
was 39.6% for single filers’ incomes over US$ 415,050. 
Trump expects that a low level of corporation tax will keep US companies from 
outsourcing jobs: 
 
Our jobs are fleeing the country. They're going to Mexico. They're going to 
many other countries. You look at what China is doing to our country in terms of 
making our product. […] So Ford is leaving. You see that, their small car divi-
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sion leaving. Thousands of jobs leaving Michigan, leaving Ohio. […] But we 
have to stop our jobs from being stolen from us. We have to stop our compa-
nies from leaving the United States and, with it, firing all of their people. All you 
have to do is take a look at Carrier air conditioning in Indianapolis. They left – 
fired 1,400 people. They're going to Mexico. So many hundreds and hundreds 
of companies are doing this. We cannot let it happen. Under my plan, I'll be re-
ducing taxes tremendously, from 35 percent to 15 percent for companies, small 
and big businesses. That's going to be a job creator like we haven't seen since 
Ronald Reagan. It's going to be a beautiful thing to watch. Companies will 
come. […] I'm going to cut regulations. I'm going to cut taxes big league, and 
you're going to raise taxes big league, end of story” (Clinton and Trump 2016a). 
 
Trump furthermore announced that American companies that outsource production 
to Mexico and other countries, but bring their products back to the USA in order to 
sell, them will face tariffs of 35%: “Companies, like Carrier are firing their workers and 
moving to Mexico. Ford is moving all of its small car production to Mexico. When I’m 
President, if companies want to fire their workers and leave for Mexico, then we will 
charge them a 35% tax when they want to ship their products back into the United 
States. That means the companies won’t leave in the first place and, if they do, we’ll 
at least make money when they ship their products across the border”13. Such a 
measure is a clear state intervention into the free market. The purpose of this idea is, 
as we shall see, not to guarantee decent wages, but profitability within the USA. 
Trump believes in a national capitalism, in which US companies produce commodi-
ties in the US by exploiting US workers and export to other countries. Trump’s ver-
sion of national capitalism is not predominantly based on capital export and finance, 
but on construction, manufacturing, real estate and oil.  
The logic that jobs are being stolen blames countries such as Mexico and China 
for capitalism’s structural problems. Companies act driven by the imperative of profit-
maximisation and the logic of competition. They will therefore tend to seek every op-
portunity to maximise profits. If outsourcing to another country is possible and poses 
the opportunity to increase profits, then there will be a tendency for companies seek-
ing this opportunity. The problem arises from the combination of capitalism’s struc-
tural logic of accumulation and the competition state. Competition with low-wage 
economies can easily result in vicious downward spirals of wage dumping and pre-
carious working conditions.  
Tax cuts for corporations tend to reduce the federal budget. Such reductions tend 
to hit the poorest if they are offset by cuts of public services. A secure way of how to 
stop outsourcing is to transform companies into worker-owned co-operatives. In such 
companies, the workers are the collective owner and take all decisions together. This 
structure advances a company interest that makes workers’ interests the core of the 
company interest. Bernie Sanders argues for “new economic models” that provide 
support for the creation of worker-owned businesses. “Unlike large corporations that 
have been shipping jobs overseas, employee-owned businesses, by and large, are 
not shutting down and moving their businesses […] employee-owned businesses 
boost morale, because workers share in profits and have more control over their work 
lives. The employees are not simply cogs in a machine owned by somebody else. 
                                            
13 https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-proposes-american-desk-
protect-economic-and-national-intere  
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They have a say in how the company is run” (Sanders 2016b, 260-261). The Tax 
Policy Institute analysed Trump’s revised tax plans and concluded: 
 
The top quintile – or fifth of the distribution – would receive an average tax cut 
of $16,660 (a 6.6 percent increase in after-tax income), the top 1 percent an av-
erage tax cut nearly 13 times larger ($214,690, or 13.5 percent of after-tax in-
come), and the top 0.1 percent an average tax cut approaching $1.1 million 
(14.2 percent of after-tax income). In contrast, the average tax cut for the low-
est-income households would be $110, 0.8 percent of after-tax income. Middle-
income households would receive an average tax cut of $1,010, or 1.8 percent 
of after-tax income (Nunns et al. 2016, 9). 
 
So according to these calculations, the wealthy will be better off from these tax cuts 
and inequality will increase. The Tax Policy Institute also argues that as a result of 
Trump’s plans of lowering income and business taxes, “the federal debt would in-
crease by at least $7.0 trillion over ten years” (Nunns et al. 2016, 1). The plans would 
“substantially increase budget deficits unless offset by spending cuts 16” (9). And if 
there were spending cuts and privatisations in realms such as education, social secu-
rity and health care, then lower income groups would be hit hardest because they 
cannot easily afford private services.  
Carrier is a US company that produces air conditioning-, ventilation- and heating-
systems. It planed to outsource of up to 2,000 manufacturing jobs from Indianapolis 
to Mexico. Trump had conversations with the company’s management that as a re-
sult announced that it would only outsource parts of the jobs to Mexico: “We have 
negotiated an agreement with the incoming administration that we believe benefits 
our workers, the state of Indiana and our company. We are announcing today that 
Carrier will continue to manufacture gas furnaces in Indianapolis, in addition to retain-
ing engineering and headquarters staff, preserving more than 1,000 jobs. […] To-
day’s announcement is possible because the incoming Trump-Pence administration 
has emphasized to us its commitment to support the business community and create 
an improved, more competitive U.S. business climate. The incentives offered by the 
state were an important consideration”14.  
Bernie Sanders (2016a) commented: 
 
It is not good enough to save some of these jobs. Trump made a promise that 
he would save all of these jobs, and we cannot rest until an ironclad contract is 
signed to ensure that all of these workers are able to continue working in Indi-
ana without having their pay or benefits slashed. In exchange for allowing Unit-
ed Technologies to continue to offshore more than 1,000 jobs, Trump will re-
portedly give the company tax and regulatory favors that the corporation has 
sought. Just a short few months ago, Trump was pledging to force United 
Technologies to ‘pay a damn tax.’ He was insisting on very steep tariffs for 
companies like Carrier that left the United States and wanted to sell their for-
eign-made products back in the United States. Instead of a damn tax, the com-
pany will be rewarded with a damn tax cut. Wow! How’s that for standing up to 
corporate greed? How’s that for punishing corporations that shut down in the 
United States and move abroad? In essence, United Technologies took Trump 
                                            
14 https://www.carrier.com/carrier/en/us/news/news-
article/carrier_statement_regarding_indianapolis_operations.aspx  
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hostage and won. And that should send a shock wave of fear through all work-
ers across the country”. 
 
On November 30, 2016, Trump announced the appointment of Goldman Sachs 
banker Steven Mnuchin as Treasury Secretary. Mnuchin was active in the motion 
picture industry (RatPac Entertainment), hedge funds, and banking. He was involved 
in purchasing the mortgage corporation IndyMac that went bankrupt during the 2008 
economic crisis and offered high-risk mortgages. It was turned into the OneWest 
bank. Mnuchin announced the “largest tax change since Reagan” and said that “we 
are going to cut corporate taxes. […] We are gonna get to 15 percent” (Jopson, Mur-
phy and Sevastopolu 2016).  
Trump also announced picking Wilbur Ross as Secretary of Commerce. In 2016, 
Ross was the 232nd richest American. He had an estimated wealth of around US$ 2.9 
billion15. Ross is an investor who restructured companies in industries such as steel, 
coal, and textiles and invested into oil, gas, shipping, and transportation (Levine 
2016). The underlying rationale may be that Ross is an expert in industries that 
Trump sees as forming key economic sectors. At the same time it is clear that Ross 
is close to the financial interests of these industries. Commenting on Trumponomics, 
Ross argues: “America in general would be good because it isn’t just trade that 
Trump is gonna fix, it’s the corporate tax. Reducing the corporate tax rate from 35 
percent to 15, means that given the amount of pre-tax earnings will throw off 30 per-
cent more after tax” (Levine 2016).  
The examples of Mnuchin and Ross show how Trump brings representatives of 
the corporate class, who support hyper-capitalist politics, into key political positions. 
They support policies that favour the rich and corporations and will further advance 
the tendency that corporations pay little in taxes.  
4.1.6. Education 
Donald Trump appointed Betsy DeVos as education secretary. She comes from a 
billionaire family that owns Amway, a company that sells beauty and health products. 
Her husband Richard DeVos was in 2016 with an estimated wealth of US$ 5.4 billion 
the 88th richest American16 and the world’s 308th richest person17. According to news 
sources, Betsy DeVos “has long supported using taxpayer funds for voucher pro-
grammes, parochial schools and charters, all of which undermine and replace public 
schools and locally-elected school boards” (Lazare 2016). 
DeVos describes her involvement in educational reform the following way: “Today 
there are about 250,000 students in 33 publicly funded, private-choice programs in 
17 states and the District of Columbia. The movement’s growth is accelerating. [...] 
We think of the educational choice movement as involving many parts: vouchers and 
tax credits, certainly, but also virtual schools, magnet schools, homeschooling, and 
charter schools“18.  
DeVos is the chairman of the American Federation for Children, whose task in-
volves advancing private schools: “The American Federation for Children envisions 
                                            
15 http://www.forbes.com/forbes-400/list/#version:static_search:wilbur%20ro  
16 http://www.forbes.com/forbes-400/list/#version:static, accessed on November 28, 2016. 
17 http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/#version:static_search:devos, accessed on Novem-
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an education system where parents are empowered to choose the best educational 
environment for their child, where innovation and entrepreneurism revolutionizes our 
education system, ensuring all children, especially low-income children, are provided 
with the opportunity to receive the finest education possible, whether it be in a tradi-
tional public school, public charter school, virtual learning, private school, home 
school or blended learning“19. Trump’s campaign supported this kind of policies and 
promised to “add an additional federal investment of $20 billion towards school 
choice. This will be done by reprioritizing existing federal dollars”20.  
What could be the consequences of such policies? The National Education Asso-
ciation’s President Lily Eskelsen García commented on DeVos’s appointment: Her 
“efforts over the years have done more to undermine public education than support 
students. She has lobbied for failed schemes, like vouchers – which take away fund-
ing and local control from our public schools – to fund private schools at taxpayers’ 
expense. These schemes do nothing to help our most-vulnerable students while they 
ignore or exacerbate glaring opportunity gaps. She has consistently pushed a corpo-
rate agenda to privatize, de-professionalize and impose cookie-cutter solutions to 
public education. By nominating Betsy DeVos, the Trump administration has demon-
strated just how out of touch it is with what works best for students, parents, educa-
tors and communities“21. 
4.1.7. From Millionaire Politics to Billionaire Politics 
Most US presidents were certainly wealthy. Barack Obama’s wealth was estimated to 
be US$ 12.2 billion in 201622. The estimation of Bill Clinton’s wealth was US$ 80 mil-
lion in 201623. George W. Bush’s wealth was according to estimations US$ 35 million 
in 201624. Barack Obama’s 2014 and 2015 public financial disclosure reports25 show 
that he owned no significant shares in companies, but had income from pension in-
vestments and book royalties. Hillary Clinton’s 2015 financial disclosure report26 
shows just like the ones by her husband Bill that they both earn significant income 
from speaking fees. According to estimations, Bill Clinton earned more than US$ 100 
million from talks he gave in the year from 2001 until 201327. Bernie Sanders criti-
cised that Hillary Clinton for example received US$ 225,000 for a talk she gave in 
2013 at a Goldman Sachs conference. He said that finance capitalism “brought this 
country into the worst economic downturn since the Great Recession, the Great De-
pression of the 30s, when millions of people lost their jobs, their homes and their life 
savings. The obvious response to that is that you have got a bunch of fraudulent op-
erators and that they have got to be broken up. […] Now Secretary Clinton was busy 
giving speeches to Goldman Sachs for 225,000 dollars a speech” (Griffin, Fitzpatrick 
                                            
19 http://www.federationforchildren.org/about-us/mission/  
20 https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/education/  
21 http://www.nea.org/home/69329.htm  
22 http://www.therichest.com/celebnetworth/politician/president/barack-obama-net-worth/  
23 http://www.therichest.com/celebnetworth/politician/president/bill-clinton-net-worth/  
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and Devine 2016). Whereas Hillary and Bill Clinton interlock with corporate elites via 
talks they give, which means that they provide a service for relatively high fees, Don-
ald Trump’s interlocking is of a different nature and involves ownership shares. 
George W. Bush was US president from 2001 to 2009. In the 1970s and 1980s, he 
was involved in the oil business as part of the companies Arbusto Energy, Bush Ex-
ploration, Spectrum 7, and HKN Inc. His 1999/2000 financial disclosure-report28 
shows that Bush earned income from savings and real estate investments and capi-
tal gains from the ownership of the Texas Rangers baseball team. A group around 
Bush owned the Texas Rangers from 1989 until 1998. His real estate and financial 
income included the George W. Bush Qualified Diversified Trust and ownership of 
1583 acres in McLennan County in Texas. Both assets had a value of over US$ 1 
million. In 1978, Bush was an unsuccessful candidate for the House of Representa-
tives. He was involved in his father’s presidential campaigns in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. So although having had connections to politics, Bush did not enter poli-
tics fully before 1995 when he became Texas’s governor. Bush was just like Trump a 
capitalist-turned politician. The difference is that Bush came from a Republican family 
involved in both the oil business and politics. Donald Trump was a businessman all 
his life and turned very late towards politics. He became US president at the age of 
70 and is therefore the oldest president in US history. Another important difference 
between Bush and Trump is that Bush is certainly rich, but Trump is super-rich and is 
part of the elite of the world’s richest people. According to his 2016 financial disclo-
sure statement, Trump was before the election involved in at least 500 companies29. 
According to estimations30, Trump’s wealth was in 2016 more than 128 times as 
large as Bush’s. High quantity can turn into a different quality, which means that the 
amount of Trump’s connections and economic power may trigger a qualitative trans-
formation of the US state. 
Donald Trump is a billionaire, whose status as president and as well-connected 
billionaire results in a structure of the US state, where capitalist and state interests 
directly interlock and overlap. Traditionally this interlocking was more indirect. Trump 
is a billionaire-turned-president, who has lots of connections to many different capital-
ist industries. The interlocking of the state and capital and Trump’s representation of 
the interests of big capital can be observed in suggestions that aim at advance a low-
tax-economy that benefits big capital and state intervention that favours capital inter-
ests in industries such as private education, private health care, the pharmaceutical 
industry, the oil, gas and coal industry, the construction industry, and the transport 
industry.  
On November 30, 2016, Donald Trump announced on Twitter that he “will be leav-
ing” his “business in total in order to fully focus on running the country“ and that “legal 
documents are being crafted which take me completely out of business operations“31. 
On January 11, 2017, Trump gave a news conference, in which he announced that 
his business would be conveyed to a trust and that his sons Donald Jr. and Eric 
would take over the Trump Organization’s management. He said that we would not 
take any influence on business operations during his presidency. An ethics adviser 
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30 http://www.therichest.com/celebnetworth/politician/president/george-w-bush-net-worth/, 




28     Christian Fuchs 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2017. 
would vet national deals made by the Trump Organization for potential conflicts of 
interest. No international deals would be made. It is important to stress that Trump 
did not sell the Trump Organization and did not divest, which would have been a way 
towards eliminating possible conflicts of interest. “Trump’s commitment falls short of 
the recommendations from the Office of Government Ethics and former chief White 
House ethics advisors for both parties, who say the only way for Trump to fully inocu-
late himself from conflicts is to fully divest his business holdings and clearly break 
from financial interests” (Harwell 2017).  
Observers commented that these changes “fell short of the recommendations of 
ethics experts in both parties who have said the only way for Mr. Trump to genuinely 
eliminate potential conflicts is to place all his real estate holdings and other business 
ventures in a blind trust over which neither he nor his family has any control, severing 
him entirely from the enterprise. […] Mr. Trump’s influence over foreign and domestic 
policy as president has raised questions about whether American policy could affect 
his bottom line. For instance, he will oversee the regulation of banks, some of which 
lend money to his company, and he will have frequent contact with foreign heads of 
state, including some who run countries where he does business” (Haberman, 
Hirschfeld Davis and Lipton 2017).  
 Although there is not a direct simultaneous double role of Trump as businessman 
and president, his decades-long business practices certainly bring a capitalist interest 
to the office that he cannot easily leave behind. “The emphasis on ’business opera-
tions’, not on ownership, hinted that Mr. Trump is not ruling out retaining a financial 
stake in the Trump Organization or putting his children in control of the company. 
Ethics experts said such moves would leave Mr. Trump vulnerable to accusations 
that his official actions are motivated by personal financial interests“ (Shear and Lip-
ton 2016). 
4.1.8. The State and Capitalism in Other Parts of the World 
The changing relationship between the state and capitalism is an important dimen-
sion in the analysis of Trump. State capitalism in the case of Trump means that to a 
certain degree the state and capitalism intersect in the form of capitalist-turned-
politicians such as Donald Trump, Rex Tillerson, Andrew F. Puzder, Steven Mnuchin, 
Wilbur Ross, or Betsy DeVos.  
When talking about state capitalism, one should not forget that although Europe 
and North America dominate world trade and capital export, their companies and 
states are not the only economic and political actors in the world system. Kurlantzick 
(2016) argues in his book State Capitalism: How the Return of Statism is Transform-
ing the World that over the past two decades, state-capitalist economies have grown. 
He defines state capitalism as a political economy, in which the state exerts signifi-
cant influence over at least one-third of the 500 biggest companies and the state di-
rectly intervenes to a significant degree into the management of the economy (Kur-
lantzick 2016, 9). He argues that state-capitalism exists for example in China, Brazil, 
India, Russia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Norway, Iran, Thailand, the United 
Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Singapore, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Algeria, Qatar, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, and Kuwait. Kurlantzick argues that state capitalism can be accompanied 
by different political systems, ranging from liberal democracy to authoritarianism.  
China would be the most striking example of state capitalism. Only three of the forty-
two of the largest Chinese companies are privately owned (4). The role of the Chi-
nese state would not just involve tight political control of the country, but also an im-
portant role of state-owned enterprises, and the state intervening into and putting lim-
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its on financial markets during the 2015/2016 stock market’s crisis. Public invest-
ments into city infrastructure form another element of Chinese state capitalism. China 
also subsidised some of its exports and by state-regulation established export-
processing zones, in which foreign capital has access to cheap labour. However, one 
needs to take into account that according to statistics, capitalist ownership dominates 
the Chinese economy (see Fuchs 2015, chapter 7). According to official statistics, in 
2015 state-owned and collective enterprises accounted for 12.3% of industrial profits, 
share-holding companies for 46.0%, private enterprises for 24.9%, and foreign inves-
tors’ companies for 16.8% (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2016). One of the 
problems of Kurlantzick’s book is that he opposes the United States to state capital-
ism. He argues that the US could save the world from state capitalism’s negative im-
pacts. With the rise of Donald Trump, one however cannot rule out that US society 
will take on certain elements of state capitalism.  
 
4.2. The Relationship of the State to its Citizens: Civil Liberties and State Insti-
tutions under Trump  
4.2.1. Authoritarian Statism 
Contemporary politics is shaped by authoritarian populists such as Rodrigo Duterte 
(Philippines), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Nigel Farage (UK), Jarosław Kaczyński and 
Beata Szydlo (Poland), Marine Le Pen (France), Narendra Modi (India), Viktor Orbán 
(Hungary), Vlarimir Putin (Russia), Heinz Christian Strache (Austria), Geert Wilders 
(Netherlands). Donald Trump’s presidency is the most powerful expression of the rise 
of right-wing populism. The key question in respect to state institutions and civil liber-
ties is whether Trump’s presidency may result in an authoritarian form of US capital-
ism. In the age of Trump, we should think about how to understand authoritarian cap-
italism.  
Lenin (1917, 398) argues that a “democratic republic is the best possible political 
shell for capitalism”. The problem of this assumption is that Nazi Germany shows that 
capitalism and democracy do not form a necessary unity. In contrast to fascist capi-
talism, the ground for opposition is much larger in liberal democracies. Bob Jessop 
(2016, 212) argues that under specific circumstances, authoritarian statism can be-
come the best possible shell for capitalism.  
State theorist Nicos Poulantzas argues that authoritarian statism transfers powers 
of legislation and the judiciary to the executive power of the president/prime minister. 
Authoritarian statism is a state form that features “intensified state control over every 
sphere of political democracy” and the “draconian and multiform curtailment of so-
called ‘formal’ liberties” (Poulantzas 1980/2000, 203-2014). There is a decline of the 
rule of law, also evident in “the increasing concern for the pre-emptive policing of the 
potentially disloyal and deviant” (Jessop 1990, 67). There is an encouragement of 
“the fusion of the three branches of the state – legislature, executive and judiciary” 
(Jessop 1990, 67). 
The Second World War was accompanied by the rise of a particular form of au-
thoritarian state capitalism in Germany, namely Nazi fascism. Comparable to Kur-
lantzick (2016), also critical theorist Friedrich Pollock (1975) argues that state capital-
ism has two characteristic forms: democratic and totalitarian state capitalism. His 
analysis refers to Fordist capitalism. By totalitarian state capitalism, he primarily 
means Nazi Germany. Fascist societies have powerful states. The historian Tim Ma-
son (1995, 53-76) therefore characterises Nazi Germany as a society, in which there 
was a primacy of politics over the economy. This means that companies had to sup-
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port Hitler’s regime if they wanted to survive. The state and capital formed a unity. 
Capitalism in Nazi Germany was based on combines and cartels that all used the 
leadership principle as organisational means (Neumann 2009, 233). The leadership 
principle was taken over from the Nazi-state into the economy. “The underlying [Nazi] 
ideology is racism, the sovereignty of the racial people incarnated in the Leader. The 
whole structure is at the service of two ideas, the New Order and proletarian racism” 
(Neumann 2009, 221). Cartels were formed by state power in the form of compulsory 
cartelisation (Neumann, Marcuse and Kirchheimer 2013, 270, 273-274).  
Neumann (see 2009, 221-234) disagrees with Friedrich Pollock’s view that during 
the Nazi time, there was totalitarian state capitalism in Germany. Pollock (1941, 445) 
writes that Hitler “transformed monopoly capitalism into state capitalism” (Pollock 
1941, 445). Neumann in contrast suggests that Nazi-Germany’s economy was “a 
monopolistic economy – and a command economy. It is a private capitalistic econo-
my, regimented by the totalitarian state. We suggest as a name best to describe it, 
‘Totalitarian Monopoly Capitalism’” (Neumann 2009, 261). Neumann (2009, 116-120, 
275) says that the “Aryanisation” of Jewish property played an important role in Nazi-
Germany’s monopoly capitalism. It helped to advance monopoly capital’s interests. 
Examples were Otto Wolff AG (steel), Friedrich Flick’s conglomerate (steel, iron, 
coal), or Mannesmann (steel, iron) (275, 288-292). Nazi imperialism also involved the 
“Germanisation” of militarily conquered economies (275-277). 
Neumann described proletarian racism as an aspect of fascist capitalism: “Racial 
proletarianism is the genuine theory of National Socialism and its most dangerous 
expression. […] The essence of the theory is extremely simple. Germany and Italy 
are proletarian races, surrounded by a world of hostile plutocratic-capitalistic-Jewish 
democracies. […] It exploits hatred of the Jews, aversion to capitalism, and, finally, 
utilizes Marxist phraseology and symbolism to an ever increasing extent. It is clear 
that the very purpose of the doctrine of racial proletarianism is to entice the working 
classes” (Neumann 2009, 188, 187, 188). Nazism had a short-circuited critique of 
capitalism that pitted industrial capital against finance capital. It biologised and racial-
ised this difference. 
4.2.2. Is Trump A Fascist? 
Franz Neumann (1957, 244-245) argues that modern totalitarian dictatorship, or what 
he also terms the authoritarian state, consists of five elements:  
 
1) A police state substitutes the rule of law. “The rule of law is a presumption 
on favour of the right of the citizen and against the coercive power of the 
state” (244);  
2) The centralisation of political power;  
3) The existence of a monopolistic state party;  
4) Totalitarian social controls extent to all realms of society in the form of the 
leadership principle, the synchronisation of social organisation, the substitu-
tion of bureaucracies by private leadership groups, the destruction of social 
organisations that are substituted by undifferentiated mass organisations 
and atomise the individual, and the transformation of culture into propagan-
da;  
5) The reliance on terror.  
 
These elements relate to the relationship of the state to itself, the economy, and citi-
zens/civil society. 
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Since the start of the crisis in 2008, it has become evident that the contradiction 
between global capitalism and politics at the level of the nation state has implications 
at the level of subjectivity. There has been a backlash so that the contradiction has 
been sublated into the strengthening of authoritarian statism and authoritarian popu-
list ideology. Bob Jessop argues in this context:  
 
We should particularly note the continued decline of parliament and rule of law, 
the growing autonomy of the executive, the increased importance of presidential 
or prime ministerial powers, the consolidation of authoritarian, plebiscitary par-
ties that largely represent the state to the popular masses, and – something ne-
glected by Poulantzas – the mediatization of politics as the mass media play an 
increasing role in shaping political imaginaries, programmes, and debates. A 
stronger emphasis on issues of national security and pre-emptive policing asso-
ciated with the so-called war on terror at home and abroad has reinforced the 
attack on human rights and civil liberties (Jessop 2016, 245-246). 
 
One cannot rule out that in the times we live in, states of emergency and exception 
are declared by ruling right-wing governments. “States of emergency are declared, 
commissarial dictatorships are appointed, or (quasi-)sovereign dictatorships seize 
power in response to threats to the state” (Jessop 2016, 218). This can involve the 
suspension of elections, the centralisation and monopolisation of power (ban and 
limitation of the political opposition), the concentration of state powers (legislative 
power, executive power, judiciary power), the suspension of the rule of law, the use 
of repressive state apparatuses against political opponents (control, surveillance, po-
licing, law and order politics, police killings, secret services’ covert operations, milita-
risation, war etc.) and an ideological offensive that includes real and ideological vio-
lence against foreigners, immigrants, migrants, people of colour, and other minorities.  
Influenced by Franz Neumann’s works, Robert O. Paxton (2004, 218) defines fas-
cism as “a form of political behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with com-
munity decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, ener-
gy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, work-
ing in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic 
liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints 
goals of internal cleansing and external expansion”. Elements of fascism are a sense 
of crisis, nationalism, ideological discourse of the national community as victim and 
being under decline, victimization discourse, exclusionary violence, authoritarianism 
and leadership ideology, Darwinian struggle, and the suspension of the rule of law 
(219-220). This is certainly a comprehensive definition. It however lacks any focus on 
the economy. For Neumann, fascism was the combination of a repressive, racist and 
terrorist political system, racist monopoly capitalism, and the ideologies of leadership, 
nationalism and proletarian racism.  
Paxton (2016) argues that Donald Trump means “self-indulgent demagoguery on 
behalf of oligarchy“: 
 
Superficially, he seems to have borrowed a number of fascist themes for his 
presidential campaign: xenophobia, racial prejudice, fear of national weakness 
and decline, aggressiveness in foreign policy, a readiness to suspend the rule 
of law to deal with supposed emergencies. His hectoring tone, mastery of 
crowds, and the skill with which he uses the latest communications technologies 
also are reminiscent of Mussolini and Hitler. And yet these qualities are at most 
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derivative of fascist themes and styles; the underlying ideological substance is 
very different, with the entitlements of wealth playing a greater role than fascist 
regimes generally tolerated. Trump’s embrace of these themes and styles is 
most likely a matter of tactical expediency – a decision taken with little or no 
thought about their ugly history. Trump is evidently altogether insensitive to the 
echoes his words and oratorical style evoke, which should not be surprising, 
given his apparent insensitivity to the impact of every other insult that he hurls.  
 
Given that Paxton leaves out the economic dimension in his definition of fascism, it is 
no wonder that his stress on oligarchy in his assessment of Trump plays a role in the 
conclusion he draws. One cannot rule out that elements of extreme authoritarianism 
will emerge under Donald Trump’s presidency. It could be the case or it could not be 
the case. Trump is quite unpredictable and it is not for sure to which extent he puts 
into action and radicalises what he said during his election campaign. The decisive 
questions will be whether his policies will advance the interests of US monopoly capi-
tal, limit civil liberty, limit or repress democratic opposition, advance racism, national-
ist division and violence against minorities, militarise the country, and engage in im-
perialist war.  
Roger Griffin takes an approach on Trump that is comparable to the one by Pax-
ton. Griffin (1993, 44) defines fascism as  
 
a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations a 
palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism. The fascist mentality is charac-
terized by the sense of living through an imminent turning-point in contemporary 
history, when the dominance of the allegedly bankrupt or degenerate forces of 
conservatism, individualistic liberalism and materialist socialism is finally to give 
way to a new era in which vitalistic nationalism will triumph. To combat these ri-
val political ideologies and the decadence they allegedly host (for example the 
parasitism of traditional elites, materialism, class conflict, military weakness, 
loss of racial vitality, moral anarchy, cosmopolitanism), fascist activists see the 
recourse to organized violence as both necessary and healthy. Though they 
may well make some concessions to parliamentary democracy in order to gain 
power, the pluralism of opinion and party politics upon which it rests is anathe-
ma to their concept of national unity, which implies in practice the maximum to-
talitarian control over all areas of social, economic, political and cultural life. 
 
Based on this understanding, Griffin argues that Trump is not a fascist: "You can be a 
total xenophobic racist male chauvinist bastard and still not be a fascist. […] As long 
as Trump does not advocate the abolition of America's democratic institutions, and 
their replacement by some sort of post-liberal new order, he's not technically a fas-
cist" (Cited in: Matthews 2016).  
Noam Chomsky takes an approach that differs from Paxton and Griffin. Chomsky 
argues that Trump is unpredictable and that one therefore cannot tell whether he will 
advance authoritarian statism and/or a “me”-ideology that aims at increasing his pop-
ularity:  
 
For many years, I have been writing and speaking about the danger of the rise 
of an honest and charismatic ideologue in the United States, someone who 
could exploit the fear and anger that has long been boiling in much of the socie-
ty, and who could direct it away from the actual agents of malaise to vulnerable 
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targets. That could indeed lead to what sociologist Bertram Gross called ‘friend-
ly fascism’ in a perceptive study 35 years ago. But that requires an honest ideo-
logue, a Hitler type, not someone whose only detectable ideology is Me. The 
dangers, however, have been real for many years, perhaps even more so in the 
light of the forces that Trump has unleashed (Chomsky 2016). 
 
Historian Robert Kagan (2016) argues that Trump has commonalities with fascist 
leaders: 
 
His incoherent and contradictory utterances have one thing in common: They 
provoke and play on feelings of resentment and disdain, intermingled with bits 
of fear, hatred and anger. His public discourse consists of attacking or ridiculing 
a wide range of “others” – Muslims, Hispanics, women, Chinese, Mexicans, Eu-
ropeans, Arabs, immigrants, refugees – whom he depicts either as threats or as 
objects of derision. His program, such as it is, consists chiefly of promises to get 
tough with foreigners and people of nonwhite complexion. He will deport them, 
bar them, get them to knuckle under, make them pay up or make them shut up. 
[…] [Fascist movements] play on all the fears, vanities, ambitions and insecuri-
ties that make up the human psyche. In democracies, at least for politicians, the 
only thing that matters is what the voters say they want — vox populi vox Dei. A 
mass political movement is thus a powerful and, to those who would oppose it, 
frightening weapon. When controlled and directed by a single leader, it can be 
aimed at whomever the leader chooses. […] He might be the highest-ranking 
elected guardian of the party’s most cherished principles. But if he hesitates to 
support the leader, he faces political death. 
  
It is too early to tell whether or not there will be tendencies of Trump’s rule that ad-
vance authoritarian statism in US capitalism. The decisive criteria for judging to which 
extent this development will occur are whether one will observe the decline of the 
rule of law, the concentration of power and the limitation of political opposition in or-
der to enforce policies that support the capitalist class, the leadership principle and 
leadership ideology, nationalism combined with the friend/enemy scheme and victim-
isation discourses. 
4.2.3. Law & Order Politics 
Trump stands for law and order politics:  
 
And we need law and order. If we don't have it, we're not going to have a coun-
try. […] We have to bring back law and order. Now, whether or not in a place 
like Chicago you do stop and frisk, which worked very well […] We have gangs 
roaming the street. And in many cases, they're illegally here, illegal immigrants. 
And they have guns. And they shoot people. And we have to be very strong. 
And we have to be very vigilant (Clinton and Trump 2016a).  
4.2.4. Opponents 
In 2006, Donald Trump said about comedian Rosie O’Donnell, who had criticised 
him: “If you take a look at her, she's a slob. How does she even get on television? If I 
were running The View, I'd fire Rosie. I'd look her right in that fat, ugly face of hers 
and say, 'Rosie, you're fired’“ (Oppenheim 2016). Other comments he made about 
her include the following ones: “She came to my wedding. She ate like a pig. And – I 
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mean, seriously, the wedding cake was – was – it was like missing in action. I could-
n't stand there” (Zaru 2016). “She is an unattractive person both inside and out” 
(Trump and Zanker 2008, 187-188). “I think I can cure her depression. If she’d stop 
looking in the mirror I think she’d stop being so depressed” (Trump and Zanker 2008, 
189). “I hit that horrible woman right smack in the middle of the eyes” (Trump and 
Zanker 2008, 190). In the 2016 presidential election, Trump defended these com-
ments: “[S]omebody who's been very vicious to me, Rosie O'Donnell, I said very 
tough things to her, and I think everybody would agree that she deserves it and no-
body feels sorry for her” (Clinton and Trump 2016a).  
In his book Think Big: Make It Happen In Business and Life, Trump writes: “When 
somebody screws you, screw them back in spades. […] When someone attacks you 
publicly, always strike back. […] Go for the jugular so that people watching will not 
want to mess with you” (Trump and Zanker 2008, 199). 
Democratic politics involves opposition. Opposition not just means disagreement, 
but also public disagreement, in which not always only nice words are used. If, how-
ever, the logic of retaliation is used in politics by someone coming to power and if 
somebody in this position hits back in spades and goes for the opponents’ jugulars, 
then actual dangers for democracy can arise. 
Donald Trump repeatedly made highly problematic comments about women and 
others. In a leaked videotape recorded in 2005, he says: “You know I’m automatically 
attracted to beautiful – I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Just kiss. I don’t 
even wait. And whey you’re a star they let you do it. You can do anything. Grab them 
by the pussy. You can do anything”32. Also information about other alleged problem-
atic comments and behaviour has been published (see e.g. Kranish and Fisher 2016, 
55-57, 63-69, 88-91, 109, 150, 163-165, 167, 217, 257-258, 278-279).  
The question that arises is what the implications are when a personality, who does 
not always treat others with respect, becomes US president. The question is what 
could happen in world politics if such a person feels highly provoked by other interna-
tional politicians and what reactions would follow. Only political history will tell.  
Donald Trump has at different times expressed different opinions on the question 
whether he wants to have a special prosecutor who looks into Hillary Clinton’s e-mail 
affair. The danger is that the appointment of such a special prosecutor could very 
well be interpreted as a form of political revanchism directed against a political oppo-
nent.  
In the second television debate with Clinton, Trump said:  
 
If I win, I am going to instruct my attorney general to get a special prosecutor to 
look into your situation, because there has never been so many lies, so much 
deception. There has never been anything like it, and we're going to have a 
special prosecutor. […] The people of this country are furious. […] There has 
never been anything like this where e-mails… And you get a subpoena. You get 
a subpoena, and after getting the subpoena, you delete 33,000 e-mails. And 
then you acid-wash them or bleach them, as you would say. […]   
Clinton: It is just awfully good that someone with the temperament of Donald 
Trump is not in charge of the law in our country.  
Trump: Because you’d be in jail! (Clinton and Trump 2016b).   
 
                                            
32 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-Rr7CO59HY  
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After the election, Trump came back to this issue in an interview with the New York 
Times” "Trump: I want to move forward, I don't want to move back. And I don't want 
to hurt the Clintons. I really don't. She went through a lot. And suffered greatly in 
many different ways. And I am not looking to hurt them at all. The campaign was vi-
cious. They say it was the most vicious primary and the most vicious campaign. [...] 
Deptuty Managing Editor: So you’re definitively taking that off the table? The investi-
gation? [...] Trump: No, no, but it’s just not something that I feel very strongly about" 
(Trump 2016b). 
In 2006, Donald Trump bought land in Balmedie, a village near Aberdeen in Scot-
land, in order to build a golf course and a hotel. This Trump estate is described in the 
following words on its website: “This opulent five-star property provides exquisite su-
perior and deluxe guestrooms, intimate bar and dining facilities […] MacLeod House 
& Lodge offers luxury and comfort in a secluded and dramatic location. […] MacLeod 
House & Lodge is ideally situated for visitors, business travellers and golfers”33. “The 
golf course follows a classic pattern of two out-and-back loops of nine holes. All 18 
holes thread their way engagingly through the dunes, rising here to find views of the 
sea and the coastline, plunging there into secluded valleys, offering a sequence of 
superlative topographies, landscapes, alternating between spaciousness and enclo-
sure, then panoramic view, and the whole time a rich texture of vegetation and wild-
life habitats surrounding the golf holes”34. 
Anthony Baxter’s (2011) documentary You’ve Been Trumped paints a less idyllic 
picture and shows the conflicts between Trump and Balmedie residents. Some local 
residents, including the farmer Michael Forbes, refused to sell their land to Trump. 
Donald Trump in an interview shown in the movie, said about Forbes: “His property is 
terribly maintained. It’s slum-like. It’s disgusting. […] He lives like a pig” (Baxter 
2011). The documentary shows how the residents, who stayed, faced problems with 
their new neighbour. A public statement by Trump says that Forbes "has always 
been dirty, sloppy and unkempt in his personal appearance and demeanor. He is a 
loser who is seriously damaging the image of both Aberdeenshire and his great 
country. [...] His property is a disgusting blight on the community and an environmen-
tal hazard, with leaking oil containers, rusted shacks and abandoned vehicles 
dumped everywhere. It is a very poor image and representation for the world to see 
of Scotland” (Carrell 2016).  
“Trump claimed in 2008 that his planned resort would employ 1,200 people; it cur-
rently employs 95, many of whom will be seasonal. [...] Despite the bitter opposition 
of all Scotland’s environment agencies and charities, Scottish government ministers, 
who were backed by local business and council leaders, decided the scheme was of 
national importance. In November 2008 they ruled that this allowed Trump to bull-
doze through a third of the Foveran dunes complex, a legally protected site of special 
scientific interest (SSSI), and breach the council’s structural plans, which defined 
Menie as green belt land“ (Carrell 2016). The example shows how Trump in this case 
resorted to personal abuse of an economic opponent, who had different interests 
than the billionaire businessman.  
                                            
33 
http://www.trumpgolfscotland.com/Default.aspx?p=dynamicmodule&pageid=100030&ssid=1
00047&vnf=1, accessed on November 30, 2016.   
34 
http://www.trumpgolfscotland.com/Default.aspx?p=dynamicmodule&pageid=100012&ssid=1
00034&vnf=1, accessed on November 30, 2016.  
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4.2.5. Breitbart 
Trump appointed Stephen Bannon as chief White House strategist. Bannon was a 
founding member and executive chair of Breitbart, a far-right news blog. In late 2016, 
Breitbart was the 671st most accessed web site in the world and the 127th most ac-
cessed platform in the USA35. It attracts more online readers than for example 
Bloomberg, the New York Post, ABC News, Slate, CNBC, Time Magazine, Masha-
ble, NYDailyNews, BBC, Reuters, CBS, TheDailyBeast, The Atlantic, CBS Local, and 
the New Yorker. Breitbart’s US readership increased from 7.4 million in September 
2014 to 15.8 million in September 2016 (Booth et al. 2016). 
Bannon called Occupy activists shown in a movie he made the “greasiest, dirtiest 
people you will ever see” (cited in: Friedersdorf 2016). Commenting on Black Lives 
Matter and police shootings of black Americans, Bannon said: “What if the people 
getting shot by the cops did things to deserve it? There are, after all, in this world, 
some people who are naturally aggressive and violent”36. 
 One gets an impression of the world according to Breitbart by having a look at the 
type of articles it publishes and how it portrays society in them:  
• An article by David Horowitz called the conservative commentator William a “rene-
gade Jew”37 for being critical of Donald Trump.  
• One article had the title “Birth Control Makes Women Unattrative and Crazy”38,  
• Abortion was compared to the Holocaust: “Planned Parenthood can attribute a 
good portion of their boffo baby-killing business to their president since 2006, 
Cecile Richards. Richards is well on her way to personally matching Hitler’s body 
count. Breitbart has done the grim maths so you don’t have to. Using a conserva-
tive estimate of 300,000 abortions a year – or 300 kiloscrapes, using the technical 
metric measure – Cecile Richards has presided over three million abortions, or 
three megascrapes in her ten years as president of the organisation. This has 
earned her ‘half Holocaust’ status. Full Holocaust seems eminently reachable giv-
en Planned Parenthood’s growing hegemony in the abortion industry”39.  
• On black Americans: “After 50 years of celebrating MLK’s civil rights legacy, black 
people now commit a catastrophically high amount of crime. […] So how is it then 
that there are five times fewer black people than white people in America and, yet, 
we consistently carry out a larger share of the crimes?”40 
• On white Americans: “Anti-White Racism: The Hate That Dares Not Speak Its 
Name […] A principal source of the war on white people generally and law en-
forcement in particular is our leftwing university and literary culture, which for forty 
years has taught college students that it is politically correct to hate white people; 
which fosters a hatred of America so virulent, that it has inspired millennials to 
flock to a lifelong supporter of communist causes like Bernie Sanders and to avert 
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its own gaze from this impertinent fact: the largest, most oppressive and most vio-
lent inner cities in America are 100% controlled by the Democratic Party – the par-
ty of slavery and segregation – and have been for fifty to a hundred years“41. 
• On illegal immigrants: “If you think data about illegal alien crime is hidden from 
public, just try to find information on the contagious diseases brought across our 
borders by illegal aliens from nearly 100 countries. If we survey the anecdotal and 
sporadic official data of the past fifteen years, there is no doubt we are being in-
vaded daily by dangerous diseases. There is good reason to believe the govern-
ment is minimizing this risk as part of its disinformation campaign to sanitize illegal 
immigration and to portray all critics as ‘anti-immigrant.’ Although the U.S. Border 
Patrol publishes frequent reports on the number of individuals apprehended cross-
ing the border, no agency publishes reports on the diseases they bring with them 
and then carry into our communities. […] What should scare us most is not what 
we know about the health of 700,000 illegal aliens arriving each year but what we 
do not know. When the Obama administration goes to great lengths to hide the 
truth about so many of its activities, there is no reason to trust what they are telling 
us about the health profiles of hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens released into 
the American heartland. […] If an illegal alien from Brazil or Vietnam and carry an 
infectious disease across the border by accident, what kind of diseases can be 
carried and spread by Islamic jihadis who are on a suicide mission? […] The public 
health ramifications of our scandalous open borders are possibly even more dan-
gerous and far-reaching than the economic and political consequences”42. 
 
Such articles give an impression of the ideology and conspiracies that Breitbart ad-
vances, in which white America is under attack by illegal immigrants, Muslims, liber-
als, leftists, feminists, etc. Breitbart supports Donald Trump, who promised in his 
election campaign to “make America great again”. Trump responded to the criticisms 
of Bannon and Breitbart: “I’ve known Steve Bannon a long time. If I thought he was a 
racist, or alt-right, or any of the things that we can, you know, the terms we can use, I 
wouldn’t even think about hiring him. [...] Breitbart cover things, I mean like The New 
York Times covers things. [...] Breitbart, first of all, is just a publication. [...] Now, they 
are certainly a much more conservative paper, to put it mildly, than The New York 
Times. But Breitbart really is a news organization that’s become quite successful“ 
(Trump 2016b).  
Mike Pence, Trump’s vice-president, visited the Broadway musical “Hamilton” on 
November 18, 2016, ten days after Trump had been elected. Brandon Victor Dixon, 
one of the actors, addressed Pence on behalf of the crew, saying, “Vice President-
elect Pence, we welcome you and we truly thank your for joining us here at Hamilton. 
We, sir, we are the diverse America who are alarmed and anxious that your new ad-
ministration will not protect us, our planet, our children, our parents, or defend us and 
uphold our inalienable rights, sir. What we truly hope is that this show has inspired 
you to uphold our American values and to work on behalf of all of us“43. 
Obviously, this message was an expression of concerns that Donald Trump’s ad-
ministration could limit diversity and impose discriminatory policies. Donald Trump 
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reacted to it in a tweet (see figure 5). It is interesting to see that Trump does not 
seem to see any problems about Breitbart, a publication that expresses intolerant 
views, but denunciates the Hamilton crew’s call for tolerance in a message posted to 
his 16 million followers on Twitter. 
 
 
Figure 5: Donald Trump’s reaction to the Hamilton crew’s concerns about his presi-
dency 
4.2.6. Immigration 
In 1979, Donald Trump bought the department store Bonwit Teller located at Sixth 
Avenue and 56th Street in New York. He demolished the building in order to build the 
Trump Tower. Libby Handros (1991) argues in her documentary film Trump: What’s 
the Deal? that for the demolition, William Kaszycki’s company hired more than 200 
Polish immigrants “with no working papers, who were paid one third the union rate 
and worked under difficult conditions” (Handros 1991, 31:41-31:47). One worker says 
in the documentary, “all the wires, lots of construction, it was covered with asbestos” 
(32:29-32:39). Kranish and Fisher (2006, 88) in their book Trump Revealed argue 
about the working conditions at the demolition site: “The men toiled through spring 
and summer of 1980 with sledgehammers and blowtorches, but without hard hats, 
working twelve- to eighteen-hour days, seven days a week, often sleeping on Bonwit 
Teller’s floors. They were paid less than $5 an hour, sometimes in vodka. Many went 
unpaid and were threatened with deportation if they complained”. In 1983, Harry 
Diduck filed a lawsuit against Donald Trump, arguing that workers were cheated in 
pension and welfare fund contributions not paid for the wages of the Polish workers 
(Justia 1991). There was a collective bargaining agreement between Kaszycki & 
Sons and the House Wreckers Union Local 95. The case carried on until 1999 when 
a sealed settlement was reached (Robbins 1999). 
This case indicates that illegal immigrants worked under horrible conditions at the 
Trump Tower’s construction site. Trump’s campaign made immigration a key issue 
and blamed immigrants for destroying American jobs and duping wages: “Donald J. 
Trump’s Vision: - Prioritize the jobs, wages and security of the American people. -
Establish new immigration controls to boost wages and to ensure that open jobs are 
offered to American workers first. [...] Donald J. Trump’s 10 Point Plan to Put America 
First: 1. Begin working on an impenetrable physical wall on the southern border, on 
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day one. Mexico will pay for the wall”44. ““The first thing we need to do is secure our 
southern border – and we need to do it now. We have to stop that flood, and the best 
way to do that is to build a wall. […] Nobody can build a wall like me. I will build a 
great wall on our southern border” (Trump 2015a, 23-24). 
In a speech on immigration, Trump said: 
 
When politicians talk about immigration reform, they usually mean the following: 
amnesty, open borders, and lower wages. [...] we have to listen to the concerns 
that working people have over the record pace of immigration and its impact on 
their jobs, wages, housing, schools, tax bills, and living conditions. These are 
valid concerns, expressed by decent and patriotic citizens from all backgrounds. 
[...] there is the case of 90 year-old Earl Olander, who was brutally beaten and 
left to bleed to death in his home. The perpetrators were illegal immigrants with 
criminal records who did not meet the Obama Administration’s priorities for re-
moval. [...] there is only one core issue in the immigration debate and it is this: 
the well-being of the American people. [...] there are at least 2 million criminal 
aliens now inside the country. We will begin moving them out day one, in joint 
operations with local, state and federal law enforcement. Beyond the 2 million, 
there are a vast number of additional criminal illegal immigrants who have fled 
or evaded justice. But their days on the run will soon be over. They go out, and 
they go out fast. […] Let’s secure our border. [...] Together, we can save Ameri-
can lives, American jobs, and American futures. Together, we can save Ameri-
ca itself. Join me in this mission to Make America Great Again (Trump 2016a). 
 
In this speech, Trump does not a single time mention and criticise how American 
capitalists exploit foreign workers, whom they pay extremely low wages in order to 
maximise profits. Instead he argues that illegal immigrants are criminal and have 
negative impacts on jobs, wages, housing, schools, etc. Observers of both illegal 
workers on Trump’s construction site and his election campaign could argue that his 
position is hypocritical. Trump in his speech does not condemn companies’ exploita-
tion of illegal immigrants, a strategy they use for dumping wages in general, but ra-
ther blames immigrants themselves for social dumping, which detracts attention from 
social problem’s real structural causes.  
Trump announced in his election campaign the he wants to “begin working on an 
impenetrable physical wall on the southern border [between the USA and Mexico], on 
day one. Mexico will pay for the wall”45. Repeatedly he argued that such a wall is 
needed to stop crime: “Now, I want to build the wall. We need the wall. And the Bor-
der Patrol, ICE, they all want the wall. We stop the drugs. We shore up the border” 
(Clinton and Trump 2016c). “[W]e are letting people into this country that are going to 
cause problems and crime like you've never seen. We're also letting drugs pour 
through our southern border at a record clip. At a record clip. And it shouldn't be al-
lowed to happen. […] She wants amnesty for everybody. Come right in. Come right 
over. It's a horrible thing she's doing” (Clinton and Trump 2016b). “When Mexico 
sends its people, they are not sending their best. […] They are bringing drugs, they 
are bringing crime, they are rapists. And some, I assume, are good people”. “It’s not 
only Mexico […] They’re coming from all over. […] So we have this open border […] 
And it’s not just Mexicans. […] And certainly we do have killers and plenty of other 
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problems coming over. We take them because other countries don’t want them. We 
are like a dumping ground”46. 
Such statements associate migration with crimes, drugs, rape, and killings. The 
point is that in such speeches and discussions there is hardly any mentioning of im-
migrants from Mexico and Latin America in general, who as everyday people live in 
the United States and work hard, pay taxes, and contribute to community life and civil 
society. By focusing on the exception from the rule, the impression is created that the 
exception is the norm. A study on immigrants and crime conducted by the American 
Immigration Council (2015) concluded: 
 
According to an original analysis of data from the 2010 American Community 
Survey (ACS) conducted by the authors of this report, roughly 1.6 percent of 
immigrant males age 18-39 are incarcerated, compared to 3.3 percent of the 
native-born. This disparity in incarceration rates has existed for decades, as ev-
idenced by data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses.  […] The 
2010 Census data reveals that incarceration rates among the young, less-
educated Mexican, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan men who make up the bulk of 
the unauthorized population are significantly lower than the incarceration rate 
among native-born young men without a high-school diploma. In 2010,  less-
educated native-born men age 18-39 had an incarceration rate of 10.7 percent 
– more than triple the 2.8 percent rate among foreign-born Mexican men, and 
five times greater than the 1.7 percent rate among foreign-born Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan men” (American Immigration Council 2015, 1-2). 
 
Generalising logic could also be found in a 2015 statement of the Trump campaign 
that said that “Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Mus-
lims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what 
is going on. According to Pew Research, among others, there is great hatred towards 
Americans by large segments of the Muslim population” (Trump 2015b) 
Donald Trump has scapegoated immigrants for social problems, he has played 
with the fire of nationalism, has made ambivalent announcements about investigating 
Hillary Clinton, foreign workers were highly exploited in at least one of his construc-
tion projects, he resorted to personal abuse, and he seems to have no problem with 
Breitbart’s intolerance, while condemning concerned citizens expressing fears about 
the increase of intolerance. Such circumstances indicate an authoritarian tendency. 
One has to wait and see if, and if so, how and to which extent this approach trans-
lates into authoritarian statism.  
 
4.3. International Relations under Trump 
 
International trade policies and foreign politics are two key aspects of international 
relations.  
4.3.1. International Relations 1: International Trade Policies 
The first dimension of international relations is that Trump promised in respect to 
trade policies to renegotiate or withdraw from free trade agreements such as the 
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North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP).  
Trump announced that “NAFTA will be renegotiated to get a better deal for Ameri-
can workers”47 and that he will “[w]ithdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which 
has not yet been ratified“48. His election programme argued that Trump will 
“[t]ell NAFTA partners that we intend to immediately renegotiate the terms of that 
agreement to get a better deal for our workers. If they don’t agree to a renegotiation, 
we will submit notice that the U.S. intends to withdraw from the deal. [We will] Elimi-
nate Mexico’s one-side backdoor tariff through the VAT and end sweatshops in Mex-
ico that undercut U.S. workers“49. 
Trump is sceptical of free trade agreements because he argues that they result in 
the undercutting of wages and the destruction of US manufacturing jobs: “America 
has lost nearly one-third of its manufacturing jobs since NAFTA and 50,000 factories 
since China joined the World Trade Organization“ 50. “So my plan – we're going to 
renegotiate trade deals. We're going to have a lot of free trade. We're going to have 
free trade, more free trade than we have right now. But we have horrible deals. Our 
jobs are being taken out by the deal that her husband signed, NAFTA, one of the 
worst deals ever. Our jobs are being sucked out of our economy. […] Our jobs have 
fled to Mexico and other places” (Clinton and Trump 2016c). “Look, our country is 
stagnant. We've lost our jobs. We've lost our businesses. We're not making things 
anymore, relatively speaking. Our product is pouring in from China, pouring in from 
Vietnam, pouring in from all over the world. […] I've visited so many communities” 
(Clinton and Trump 2016c). “The NAFTA agreement is defective. […] And what you 
do is you say, fine, you want to go to Mexico or some other country, good luck. We 
wish you a lot of luck. But if you think you're going to make your air conditioners or 
your cars or your cookies or whatever you make and bring them into our country 
without a tax, you're wrong. And once you say you're going to have to tax them com-
ing in, and our politicians never do this, because they have special interests and the 
special interests want those companies to leave, because in many cases, they own 
the companies” (Clinton and Trump 2016a). 
So taken together, Trump makes two arguments in respect to free trade agree-
ments:  
1) As a result of free trade agreements, cheap commodities are flooding the US 
market.  
2) As a result of free trade agreements, US manufacturing jobs are leaving the 
USA and are being conducted for lower wages in other countries. The solution 
would be tariffs and the re-negotiation of trade agreements that does not elimi-
nate free trade, but transforms it. 
Trump (2016d) sees NAFTA as a “one-way street”, which creates the impression that 
other countries and people living there have only benefited and the USA has only 
had disadvantages from NAFTA. NAFTA came into effect on January 1, 1994, and 
subsequently eliminated constraints on cross-border capital investments in and trade 
between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. On January 2, 1994, the Zapatista 
uprising started in Chiapas, Mexico’s poorest region. It was explicitly directed against 
NAFTA. In 1991, Mexico’s President Salinas abolished the system of land tenure to 
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qualify for NAFTA participation. In 1992, “he removed existing restrictions on the size 
of the large estates and abolished the Ejido Law in order to clear the way for privati-
zation of the land and thus allow national and foreign agribusiness to grow cash 
crops for export, violating the inalienability of ejido lands in Article 27 of the Mexican 
Constitution of 1917” (Marcos 2002, 429). The Zapatista rebels assessed “that 
NAFTA will not bring them benefits, but ‘a death sentence’” (Marcos 2002, xxv). 
Mexico’s socio-economic situation has not really improved through NAFTA: In the 
period from 1994-2013, Mexico’s GDP increased on average by only 0.9 percent per 
year (Weisbrot, Lefebvre and Sammut 2014). Mexico’s poverty rate was in 2012 
52.3% and in 1994 52.4%, so the country stayed extremely poor during NAFTA’s first 
twenty years (ibid.). Real wages stagnated (ibid.). “NAFTA removed tariffs (but not 
subsidies) on agricultural goods, with a transition period in which there was a steadily 
increasing import quota for certain commodities. The transition period was longest for 
corn, the most important crop for Mexican producers, only ending in 2008. Not sur-
prisingly, U.S. production, which is not only subsidized but had higher average 
productivity levels than that of Mexico, displaced millions of Mexican farmers” 
(Weisbrot, Lefebvre and Sammut 2014, 13). In the years 1991-2007, Mexico lost 
more than 2 million jobs in agriculture and forestry, which is a level of 19% (ibid., 13). 
The number of Mexican Maquiladora factories has especially been expanding 
since NAFTA came into effect. Maquiladoras exist as part of Special Economic 
Zones, especially in Northern Mexican border cities such as Ciudad Juárez, Heroica 
Nogales, Matamoros, Mexicali, and Tijuana. They make use of NAFTA for importing 
materials tariff- and duty-free, are known for low wages and harsh working condi-
tions, and export the end products back to the countries of the resources’ origin. Im-
portant industries involved in maquiladoras are those that produce machinery, chem-
icals, automotive parts, furniture, electronics, textiles, packaging, plastics, metal, 
medical devices, and call centre services (Dorocki and Brzegowy 2014, figure 3 & 4). 
“The mission of the maquiladoras” is “lowering labor costs by importing and pro-
cessing raw materials to be exported as finished products back to the country of 
origin – normally to the United States” (Dorocki and Brzegowy 2014, 94). In the peri-
od from 1994 until 2006, US companies accounted for 88.4% of all capital invest-
ments in Mexican maquiladoras (Dorocki and Brzegowy 2014, table 1). In 2012, 
there were more than 5,000 maquiladoras with a total of more than 2 million employ-
ees (Dorocki and Brzegowy 2014, table 2). Piece wages are common in maquilado-
ras. Maquiladora workers tend to be paid at a fraction of their US equivalents, tend to 
work long hours and to face difficult working conditions.  
The 2017 Californian minimum wage is US$ 10.5 per hour for companies that em-
ploy more than 25 employees and US$ 10.0 for smaller companies51. The 2017 Mex-
ican daily minimum wage is 80.04 pesos52 (approximately US$ 3.9). In September 
2016, the Mexican average daily wage was MXN 316.57 (around US$ 15.3)53. In No-
vember 2016, the average daily earnings of employees in the USA were around US$ 
17854. This means that the average wage is twelve times higher in the USA than in 
Mexico. Tijuana is a town located in the Mexican state Baja California. It is based 
right on the border to California. In Tijuana, one of the maquiladora industry’s cen-
tres, manufacturing workers’ average monthly salary was in the year 2016 US$ 304 
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for unskilled workers and US$ 368 for highly skilled workers55. In California, produc-
tion workers’ average monthly salary was US$ 298056. So the average manufacturing 
wage was 10 times lower in Tijuana than in California. The implication is that US 
companies can use NAFTA for reducing labour costs by a factor of around 10 in or-
der to maximise their profits.  
The point is that NAFTA helps both US corporations as well as Mexican suppliers 
to increase their profits, whereas Mexican workers are paid at relatively low levels 
and US manufacturing workers lose their jobs. The international working class is the 
overall loser. The problem of Trump’s analysis is that he presents NAFTA in a one-
sided and nationalist manner as an issue of nations, whereas it is in reality an issue 
of class. Trump seems only to care about US corporations’ profits, whereas the reali-
ty is that through NAFTA international capital takes advantage of the working class in 
Mexico, the USA and Canada.  
Robert Scott (2011) argues in an analysis published by the Economic Policy Insti-
tute that NAFTA has been the context for the circumstance that “U.S. trade deficits 
with Mexico as of 2010 displaced production that could have supported 682,900 U.S. 
jobs “ (2). The basic reason would have been foreign direct investments of US capital 
in Mexico. 22% of these jobs would have been in the manufacturing of computer and 
electronic parts, 15.8% in the manufacturing of cars and the production of automotive 
parts.  
When Trump argues that NAFTA destroys US jobs and therefore should be rene-
gotiated or abolished, he in a nationalist manner only sees the US side of the coin, 
but disregards that NAFTA seems to also have destroyed over two million agricultural 
jobs in Mexico because of the USA’s export of subsidised corn and cheap grain.  
The same issue arises in respect to China. Trump argues: “And Apple, and our 
other major companies, will start making their iPhones, computers and other products 
inside of the United States – not in China, and all over the world“ (Trump 2016d). 
“There are people who wish I wouldn’t refer to China as our enemy. But that’s exactly 
what they are. They have destroyed entire industries by utilizing low-wage workers, 
cost us tens of thousands of jobs, spied on our businesses, stolen our technology, 
and have manipulated and devalued their currency, which makes importing our 
goods more expensive – and sometimes, impossible” (Trump 2015a, 43). The basic 
problem is that the international division of labour does not benefit Chinese and 
American workers, but both Apple that exports labour and capital and Foxconn, in 
whose Chinese factories Apple tools are assembled under precarious conditions 
(Fuchs 2017b, Qiu 2016). For Trump the issue is one of nation and nationalism, not 
one of capitalism’s structural contradictions. He uses the friend/enemy scheme when 
opposing the Chinese nation to the American nation.  
Donald Trump criticises China’s export of substituted steel at cheap prices: “You 
take a look at what's happening to steel and the cost of steel and China dumping vast 
amounts of steel all over the United States, which essentially is killing our steelwork-
ers and our steel companies” (Clinton and Trump 2016b). Newsweek reports that an 
investigation it conducted “has found that in at least two of Trump’s last three con-
struction projects, Trump opted to purchase his steel and aluminium from Chinese 
manufacturers rather than United States corporations based in states like Pennsylva-
nia, Ohio, Michigan and Wisconsin. […] Of Trump’s last three construction projects, 
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the first to use Chinese steel was Trump International Hotel Las Vegas, which 
opened in 2008. […] According to government documents, the Chinese entity chosen 
by Trump to provide steel for the Las Vegas property is a holding company called 
Ossen Innovation Co. Ltd.–formerly known as Ultra Glory International Ltd. […] An-
other recent Trump building that has used metal from China is Trump International 
Hotel and Tower in Chicago, which opened in 2009. […] Because American busi-
nesses have been turning to cheaper aluminium from overseas, the industry is col-
lapsing. For example, in just the last two years, more than half of the country’s alu-
minium smelters in states like Ohio, West Virginia and Texas have closed as a result 
of being undercut on price by competition from overseas” (Eichenwald 2016).  
So it looks like although Trump criticises capitalists making use of structural ad-
vantages for increasing their profits at the expense of US workers, according to these 
reports his own company made use of such mechanisms, which questions how cred-
ible and authentic his political commitments are. 
How does Trump respond to this type of criticism? “The same thing is true with 
having my products made in China or Mexico or other countries. Some have attacked 
me for urging that we complain about these countries at the same time I’m having 
goods manufactured there. My response: I’m a realist. I’m a competitor. When I am 
working on a business deal, I make the best deal. But we should be changing the 
business climate so that manufacturers can get the best deal right here in the US. 
Right now it doesn’t work that way. We need legislation that gives American compa-
nies the tax priorities and financial support to create more of their technology and to 
redirect more of their manufacturing here at home” (Trump 2015a, 86).  
Trump’s answer is to create investment conditions for capital in the USA that keep 
capital there and attract new capital. Given the contradictory nature of capitalism, 
good business climate also tends to mean, as the example of China shows, low 
wages in order to increase profits. When Trump talks about his vision of making the 
American economy great again, then increasing minimum wages, guaranteeing eve-
ryone earns a living wage, and the importance of trade unions are missing (see 
Trump 2015a).  
4.3.2. International Relations 2: Foreign Politics 
Foreign politics constitutes the second element of international relations. Donald 
Trump has announced that other NATO members will have to contribute more to the 
alliance’s budget if they want to count on the USA’s support. He plans a trade war 
with China, co-operation with Russia and Syria, a military offensive against ISIS, and 
a tough stance on the Iran nuclear deal. His plans include to: 
 
• “- End the current strategy of nation-building and regime change. […] 
- Pursue aggressive joint and coalition military operations to crush and destroy 
ISIS, international cooperation to cutoff their funding, expand intelligence sharing, 
and cyberwarfare to disrupt and disable their propaganda and recruiting. […] 
- Suspend, on a temporary basis, immigration from some of the most dangerous 
and volatile regions of the world that have a history of exporting terrorism”57. 
• In respect to NATO, Trump said: “Number one, the 28 countries of NATO, many 
of them aren't paying their fair share. Number two – and that bothers me, because 
we should be asking – we're defending them, and they should at least be paying 
us what they're supposed to be paying by treaty and contract. And, number two, I 
                                            
57 https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/foreign-policy-and-defeating-isis/  
tripleC 15(1): 1-72, 2017 45 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2017. 
said, and very strongly, NATO could be obsolete, because […] they do not focus 
on terror. […] we pay approximately 73 percent of the cost of NATO. It's a lot of 
money to protect other people. But I'm all for NATO. But I said they have to focus 
on terror, also.” (Clinton and Trump 2016a). “We defend Germany. We defend Ja-
pan. We defend South Korea. These are powerful and wealthy countries. We get 
nothing from them” (Trump 2015a, 34).  
• On ISIS: “I think we have to get NATO to go into the Middle East with us, in addi-
tion to surrounding nations, and we have to knock the hell out of ISIS, and we 
have to do it fast, when ISIS formed in this vacuum created by Barack Obama and 
Secretary Clinton” (Clinton and Trump 2016a) 
• On Putin and Russia: “Now we can talk about Putin. I don't know Putin. He said 
nice things about me. If we got along well, that would be good. If Russia and the 
United States got along well and went after ISIS, that would be good. He has no 
respect for her [Hillary Clinton]. He has no respect for our president. And I'll tell 
you what: We're in very serious trouble, because we have a country with tremen-
dous numbers of nuclear warheads – 1,800, by the way – where they expanded 
and we didn't, 1,800 nuclear warheads. And she's playing chicken” (Clinton and 
Trump 2016c). 
• On Cuba: “Today, the world marks the passing of a brutal dictator who oppressed 
his own people for nearly six decades. […] Fidel Castro's legacy is one of firing 
squads, theft, unimaginable suffering, poverty and the denial of fundamental hu-
man rights. While Cuba remains a totalitarian island, it is my hope that today 
marks a move away from the horrors endured for too long, and toward a future in 
which the wonderful Cuban people finally live in the freedom they so richly de-
serve. […] Though the tragedies, deaths and pain caused by Fidel Castro cannot 
be erased, our administration will do all it can to ensure the Cuban people can fi-
nally begin their journey toward prosperity and liberty. I join the many Cuban-
Americans who supported me so greatly in the presidential campaign, including 
the Brigade 2506 Veterans Association that endorsed me, with the hope of one 
day soon seeing a free Cuba." (Scott 2016). “If Cuba is unwilling to make a better 
deal for the Cuban people, the Cuban/American people and the U.S. as a whole, I 
will terminate deal”58. 
 
Trump seems to operate with a clear friend/enemy-scheme, in which the enemies 
must be crushed and one keeps out of alliances that do not tackle these enemies. It 
might very well be that Trump’s foreign politics will not be isolationist, but unilateralist 
and highly unpredictable so that the future of the world may be at risk. In any case, 
he argues for massive armament: “’Iron Mike’ Tyson, the famous fighter, once ex-
plained his philosophy, saying, ‘Everybody has a plan until they get punched in the 
mouth.’ The first thing we need to do is build up our ability to throw that punch. We 
need to spend whatever it takes to completely fund our military properly. […] Every-
thing begins with a strong military. Everything. We will have the strongest military in 
our history, and our people will be equipped with the best weaponry and protection 
available. Period. That means the best missile systems, the best cyber-warfare train-
ing and equipment, and the best-trained soldiers” (Trump 2015a, 32-33, 47).  
Trump describes himself as “aggressive in military and foreign policy” (Trump 
2015a, 98). “No enemy, and no enemy, leader should misinterpret our resolve to fight 
to the death – their death” (Trump 2015a, 138). The problem of the complexity of in-
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ternational political relations involves the possibility of nuclear warfare. So fighting a 
nation to its death may at the same time mean the end of life on Earth. 
Trump appointed US Marine General James Mattis as defence secretary. Accord-
ing to news reports, Mattis for example said: “Actually, it's a lot of fun to fight. You 
know, it's a hell of a hoot. […] It's fun to shoot some people. I'll be right up front with 
you, I like brawling"; “You go into Afghanistan, you got guys who slap women around 
for five years because they didn't wear a veil. […] You know, guys like that ain't got 
no manhood left anyway. So it's a hell of a lot of fun to shoot them” (Associated 
Press 2016). 
Trump argues: “When somebody screws you, screw them back in spades. […] 
When someone attacks you publicly, always strike back. […] Go for the jugular so 
that people watching will not want to mess with you” (Trump and Zanker 2008, 199). 
Given that Trump believes in a world that is full of enemies, it may be quite unpre-
dictable what he does in a situation of a highly polarised political conflict. In interna-
tional politics, it is not always clear what the frontlines are and who the political ag-
gressor is. The Soviet Union felt threatened by the deployment of US nuclear weap-
ons in Italy and Turkey. The USA felt threatened by the deployment of Soviet nuclear 
weapons in Cuba. Each blamed the other. The problem is that warfare, competition 
and conflict often result in vicious cycles of aggression, violence, and armament. It is 
in such situations difficult to make out who started the conflict and each side blames 
the other for it. If a highly polarised international political situation occurred under 
Donald Trump’s presidency and he applied the logic “When somebody screws you, 
screw them back in spades. When someone attacks you publicly, always strike back. 
Go for the jugular so that people watching will not want to mess with you”, then a nu-
clear war might be the result.  
On December 22, Trump tweeted about expanding the USA’s nuclear armament 
(see figure 6). On the same day, Vladimir Putin said Russia needs “to strengthen the 
military potential of strategic nuclear forces”59. Given Putin and Trump’s announce-
ments, a new nuclear arms race seems to be in the making that certainly increases 
the chances of a nuclear war and planetary destruction. Trump commented: “Let it be 
an arms race. We will outmatch them at every pass and outlast them all"60. The point 
is that not armament, but only disarmament will end the threat of such a catastrophe 
that could easily wipe out humankind.  
 
 
Figure 6: Donald Trump tweets about nuclear armament 
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So what lots of people fear is that Trump’s personality is too uncontrolled and too 
revengeful, which could be dangerous in a ticklish political situation. The fear is that 
he may press the nuclear button. Whereas toughness, retaliation and brutality are the 
very features of capitalism, witch which capitalist corporations are confronted day by 
day in competition in order to survive, the rest of society does not automatically follow 
the same logic. Although the logic of the survival of the fittest also tends to be imitat-
ed in politics, there are boundaries of this logic that when crossed result in situations 
of no return, in which political violence escalates. The logic of Social Darwinism can 
in politics easily lead to the extinction of mankind.  
The point is that such dangerous situations can only be overcome if both sides talk 
to each other, overcome their individual standpoints, and make compromises. So for 
example the Cuban missile crisis could only be overcome because John F. Kennedy 
and Nikita Khrushchev communicated with each other and Robert Kennedy and the 
Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met secretly and agreed that the USA would 
remove its missiles from Turkey and Italy and the Soviet Union its missiles from Cu-
ba. Diplomacy and communication seem to be the important features of mastering 
such dangerous situations in international politics. So the question is whether Donald 
Trump has what it takes for international diplomacy. If it turns out that the answer is 
“No”, the world may come to an end. Only history will tell. 
In 2016, ExxonMobil was the world’s 9th largest transnational company and the 
largest oil and gas corporation61. In 2015, it made profits of US$ 16.2 billion. Donald 
Trump appointed ExxonMobil’s CEO Rex Tillerson as US secretary of state. As sec-
retary of state, Tillerson does of course not keep up his role as CEO. But having 
spent more than forty years working for ExxonMobil, it is unlikely he can easily leave 
behind his past and the interests of the industry that he represented for decades.  
The US secretary of state is in charge of foreign policy and diplomacy and is one 
of the US cabinet’s most influential politicians. Wars have been fought over oil be-
cause oil is such a crucial resource for keeping fossil capitalism going, wars have 
been fought over it. If the oil and gas industry’s interests determine foreign policy, 
then there is a danger that not prospects for democracy and human rights, but busi-
ness interests determine international relations. Eric Ferrero, director of communica-
tions for Amnesty International USA, asked: “We know that Tillerson has been suc-
cessful in safeguarding the interests of a massive oil company – will he be as invest-
ed in safeguarding human rights abroad?”62 John Sauven, who is Greenpeace UK’s 
executive director, commented: “So a real-life JR Ewing becomes America’s chief 
diplomat as Donald Trump does away with the usual intermediaries and directly out-
sources foreign policy to the fossil fuel industry. We spent years warning that Exxon 
was too close to the US government. Now they are the government” (Gambino and 
Yuhas 2016). 
Exxon Mobil has been subject to a lawsuit concerning allegations of human rights 
violations:  
 
In 2001, eleven Indonesian villagers filed suit against ExxonMobil in US federal 
court alleging that the company was complicit in human rights abuses commit-
ted by Indonesian security forces in the province of Aceh.  The plaintiffs main-
tain that ExxonMobil hired the security forces, who were members of the Indo-
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nesian military, to protect the natural gas extraction facility and pipeline which 
ExxonMobil was operating.  The plaintiffs further claim that ExxonMobil knew or 
should have known about the Indonesian military’s human rights violations 
against the people of Aceh.  The plaintiffs allege that they suffered human rights 
violations, such as murder, torture and rape, at the hands of these security forc-
es. […] In a decision issued in July 2015, a US federal court ruled that the plain-
tiffs' claims sufficiently "touch and concern" the United States and may proceed 
in US court63. 
5. Trumpology: Ideology and the State under Trump 
 
There is a complex relationship between politics and culture in general and the state 
and ideology in capitalist society. The state’s collective and individual actors produce 
meanings about society, and individuals and groups in society make meaning of the 
state. We can therefore distinguish between discourses by the state and discourses 
on the state.  
In discourses by the state, politicians, parties, governments, political institutions or 
communication workers employed by such state institutions produce and communi-
cate specific interpretations of society to the public. A government or party pro-
gramme is an example. In discourses on the state, individuals and groups in society 
interpret what state actors and institutions are doing and express and communicate 
these interpretations in semiotic forms. Examples are a conversation about the gov-
ernment between friends, media reports about a political event, or a consultancy 
agency’s development of a communication strategy for a political party. Discourses 
are semiotic representations of reality through which humans communicate and 
make meanings of certain aspects of the world. Discourses by the state can therefore 
also be called semiotic representations by the state. Discourses on the state can also 
be termed semiotic representations of the state. 
Discourses by and on the state are to specific degrees ideological in character, i.e. 
ideologies by the state and ideologies on the state. In ideologies by the state, state 
actors justify domination and/or exploitation. In ideologies on the state, individuals or 
groups justify state actions that enact, practice or justify domination and/or exploita-
tion. The distinction between discourses and ideologies points towards the potentially 
contradictory character of discourses by the state and discourses on the state so that 
they may have a contested character.  
Given that Trump is the US president, his general view of the world is relevant for 
understanding the state’s ideology (ideology by the state) during his rule. Having a 
look at his ideological views may also reveal what role he assigns to the state in so-
ciety (ideology on the state). Trumpology is Trump-style ideology. It is not the ideolo-
gy of a single person, but rather a whole way of thought and life that consists of ele-
ments such as hyper-individualism, hard labour, leadership, the friend/enemy-
scheme, and Social Darwinism. 
  
5.1. Possessive Hyper-Individualism 
 
Hyper-individualism is Trumpology’s first element. Trump is a brand. Trump is a 
strategy. Trump is entertainment. Trump is a spectacle. Trump is politics. Trump is 
the instrumentalisation of everything surrounding him. Trump is the absolute com-
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modification of the self. Donald Trump made a career by branding and selling him-
self. His presidential campaign was also focused on Trump as brand, celebrity, bil-
lionaire and political leader. As a consequence, Trump likes talking in the first person 
singular. “I”, “me”, “my” and “mine” are among his most frequently used words. Trum-
pology is about possessive individualism, the individual as owner.  
Consider the following example: 
 
Whenever I start something new, I know I have tons to learn. I see each new 
project as a blank page that I can’t wait to fill. I get excited because I love to in-
vestigate, dig in new areas, acquire information, put it together, and gain an in-
depth understanding of something completely new. I’ve had this feeling at every 
stage of my career; it’s how I begin every successful project. I consider it a sign; 
if I don’t feel excited, I usually pass on the opportunity, even if it could produce 
huge profits. My enthusiasm drives me to learn, and what I learn gives me more 
control. My knowledge also helps me avoid mistakes and eliminate problems 
that could arise. I studied up on travel before starting GoTrump.com, my travel 
agency. I studied the men’s fashion industry for my Donald J. Trump Signature 
Collection of menswear. I researched and read carefully before starting Trump 
University; and that’s just to name a few examples (Trump 2007, 94-95).  
 
This short passage from Trump’s book Trump 101: The Way to Success consists of 
nice sentences, in which the term “I” occurs sixteen times, “my” five times, and “me” 
three times. This means that in this passage, Trump on average uses the first person 
singular 2.3 times per sentence.  
The philosopher Erich Fromm (1997, 91-92) characterises possessive individual-
ism as a having-centred ideology of accumulation: 
  
Speaking more generally, the fundamental elements in the relation between in-
dividuals in the having mode of existence are competition, antagonism, and 
fear. The antagonistic element in the having relationship stems from its nature. 
If having is the basis of my sense of identity because "I am what I have," the 
wish to have must lead to the desire to have much, to have more, to have most. 
In other words, greed is the natural outcome of the having orientation. It can be 
the greed of the miser or the greed of the profit hunter or the greed of the wom-
anizer or the man chaser. Whatever constitutes their greed, the greedy can 
never have enough, can never be "satisfied." In contrast to physiological needs, 
such as hunger, that have definite satiation points due to the physiology of the 
body, mental greed – and all greed is mental, even if it is satisfied via the body 
– has no satiation point, since its consummation does not fill the inner empti-
ness, boredom, loneliness and depression it is meant to overcome. In addition, 
since what one has can be taken away in one form or another, one must have 
more, in order to fortify one's existence against such danger. If everyone wants 
to have more, everyone must fear one's neighbor's aggressive intention to take 
away what one has. To prevent such attack one must become more powerful 
and preventively aggressive oneself.  
 
Trump summarises his philosophy: “A big ego is a positive thing” (Trump and Zanker 
2008, 280). His individualism is his capital accumulation strategy. His self is the 
commodity he sells.  
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5.2. Performance and the Ideology of Hard Labour 
 
Trumpology’s second element is the ideology of hard labour. “My father didn’t give 
me much money, but what he did give me was a good education and the simple for-
mula for getting wealthy: work hard doing what you love” (Trump and Zanker 2008, 
44). “Hard work is my personal method for financial success” (32) “You can help cre-
ate your own luck, you can make things happen through hard work and intelligence. 
You can become luckier” (114). “The harder you work, the luckier you get” (135). Ce-
lebrities, billionaires, successful businesspeople and superstars’ “attitudes, actions, 
persistence, and passion […] separate the winners from the losers” (1).  
The implication is that the working poor do not work or do not work hard enough. 
News sources say that Trump’s father Fred, a rich real estate developer, supported 
his son financially in a significant manner at the start of his career, on other occa-
sions and when Donald faced financial problems (Kranish and Fisher 2016, 75, 95, 
124-125, 201, 294). Of course good parents want to see their children thrive and be 
happy and therefore try to support them. But some can do so more than others. And 
rich parents can do so in a very powerful way. As a result, in capitalism some tend to 
be luckier than others because they had the luck to be born into wealthy families. 
 
5.3. The Leadership Ideology 
 
Leadership thinking is Trumpology’s third element. “I’m not bragging when I say that 
I’m a winner. I have experience in winning. That’s what we call leadership. That 
means that people will follow me and be inspired by what I do. How do I know? I’ve 
been a leader my whole life” (Trump 2015a, 9). “Leadership is not a group effort. If 
you’re in charge, then be in charge. […] I’m the conductor who leads the Trump Or-
ganization; I set the tempo. In my organization, I set a rapid pace, which is called al-
legro in symphonic circles. I pay close attention to tempo because I know that it’s vital 
to keep the momentum going at all times. I provide strong leadership, and, at times, 
this can be hard and not what I want to do” (Trump 2007, 101, 125-126). 
Trump also thinks of politics in terms of leadership. The very ideology of making 
America great again is based on the assumption that the USA needs to be the leader 
of the world in every respect: “The idea of American Greatness, of our country as the 
leader of the free and unfree world, has vanished” (Trump 2015a, xi). And Trump ar-
gues that making the USA lead the world needs a strong leader who manages the 
country and the world like a company:  
 
Despite all of these challenges – and actually because of the challenges – I de-
cided to do something about it. I couldn’t stand to see what was happening to 
our great country. This mess calls for leadership in the worst way. It needs 
someone with common sense and business acumen, someone who can truly 
lead America back to what has made us great in the past. We need someone 
with a proven track record in business who understands greatness, someone 
who can rally us to the standard of excellence we once epitomized and explain 
what needs to be done (Trump 2015a, xi). 
 
Another associated argument that Trump frequently employs is that career politicians 
are weak leaders: “In politics, once someone gets elected, it’s tough to get them out. 
There’s no motivation to try to get anything done. […] Career politicians like it this 
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way; being a politician is their career. I know many of them; believe me, they couldn’t 
get a job in private industry. They don’t want anyone taking away their great pension 
plan and health benefits – that you are paying for” (Trump 2015a, 94). 
 
5.4. Social Darwinism & the Friend/Enemy-Scheme 
 
Social Darwinism and the friend/enemy scheme form Trumpology’s fourth dimension. 
Social Darwinism is a highly competitive and militaristic view of society, in which 
there is constant egoism, battle, conflict, and war. It is based on the assumption that 
only the strong can and should survive and that survival requires crushing enemies.  
 
“The world is a vicious and brutal place. We think we’re civilized. In truth, it’s a 
cruel world and people are ruthless. […] People will be mean and nasty and try 
to hurt you just for sport. Lions in the jungle only kill for food, but humans kill for 
fun” (Trump and Zunker 2008, 29).  
 
“Everyone wants to kill the fastest gun” (176).  
 
“The same burning greed that makes people loot, kill, and steal in emergencies 
like fires and floods, operates daily in normal everyday people. It lurks right be-
hind the surface, and when you least expect it, it rears its nasty head and bites 
you. Accept it. The world is a brutal place. “I love to crush the other side and 
take the benefits. Why? Because there is nothing greater. For me it is even bet-
ter than sex, and I love sex” (48).  
 
When somebody screws you, screw them back in spades. […] Go for the jugu-
lar so that people watching will not want to mess with you (199). 
 
Using such descriptions, Trump certainly gives a realist picture of capitalism. Capital-
ism is per definition a machine of capital accumulation that operates with economic 
life and death as its inputs and outputs. But if all aspects of society were driven by 
war-like competition, then society could not exist. And expanding and intensifying this 
logic brings about existential threats for society. Basing politics on the logic of the 
“survival of the fittest” poses the danger of heavy military instead of diplomatic re-
sponses to political disagreements. If such situations where the logic of the survival 
of the fittest prevails between powerful nations (such as the USA on the one side and 
China, Russia or Iran on the other side), then spirals of violence can occur that esca-
late. Thinking this logic to the end means that Social Darwinism in society not just 
poses the threat of a World War, but of nuclear destruction. 
 
5.5. Trump and the Media 
 
Trumpology does not simply exist because of a single individual. Like any ideology, it 
requires hegemony. It requires those who admire Trump as brand and leader. And it 
also requires public visibility. Trumpology needs Trump as media spectacle. The 
Trump spectacle has two dimensions. On the one side Trump understands well how 
to stage himself as scandalous spectacle in order to attract media attention. On the 
other side the media also need someone like Trump for staging spectacles that at-
tract a large audience. There is a profit motive on both sides of mediated Trumpology 
spectacles: The one side is looking for advertising, marketing and public relations 
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opportunities in order to be able to better sell a range of branded commodities. The 
other side is looking for content that attracts a large audience and thereby allows sell-
ing advertising space expensively.  
The reporting and content can be quite contentious, with reporters trying to unveil 
ever more scandals and nastiness. The response is criticisms of the media and the 
claim of unfair treatment in the media. It is this contentiousness that keeps the spec-
tacle machinery going, creates the need for more scandals, more controversy, more 
spectacles, and possibly more audience attention and thereby more profits and atten-
tion for both the mainstream media and their subject of coverage. Contention and 
symbiosis are two poles of the Trump spectacle’s dialectic that drives profitability. By 
Trump making news in the media, the media make Trump. 
Bernie Sanders (2016b, 421) argues that he learned from having media exposure 
during the Democratic Party’s primaries that “the more important the issue is to large 
numbers of working people, the less interesting it is to corporate media” . 
 
[T]he nature of media coverage today, especially on television, mostly calls for 
short sound bites on what the media establishment determines is the “issue of 
the day. [..] For the corporate media, the real issues facing the American people 
– poverty, the decline of the middle class, income and wealth inequality, trade, 
health care, climate change, etc. – are fairly irrelevant. For them, politics is 
largely presented as entertainment. […] Turn on CNN or other networks cover-
ing politics and what you will find is that the overwhelming amount of coverage 
is dedicated to personality, gossip, campaign strategy, scandals, conflicts, polls 
and who appears to be winning or losing, fund-raising, the ups and downs of the 
campaign trail, and the dumb things a candidate may say or do. Political cover-
age is the drama of what happens on the campaign trail. It has very little to do 
with the needs of the American people and the ideas or programs a candidate 
offers to address the problems facing the country. […] The “politics as enter-
tainment” approach works very well for someone like Donald Trump, an experi-
enced entertainer. […] For the corporate media, name-calling and personal at-
tacks are easy to cover, and what it prefers to cover (Sanders 2016b, 424-425). 
 
Trump is quite aware of this peculiar relationship between him and the mainstream 
media:  
 
The personal exchanges between me and others become the big story of the 
debate and the focus of news coverage for weeks. […] I use the media the way 
the media uses me – to attract attention. […] So sometimes I make outrageous 
comments and give them what they want – viewers and readers – in order to 
make a point. I’m a businessman with a brand to sell. […]  The cost of a full-
page ad in the New York Times can be more than $100,000. But when they 
write a story about one of my deals, it doesn’t cost me a cent, and I get more 
important publicity. I have a mutually profitable two-way relationship with the 
media – we give each other what we need. And now I am using that relationship 
to talk about the future of America. […] These media types sell more magazines 
when my face is on the cover, or when I bring a bigger audience to their televi-
sion show than they normally attract, and by far. And what’s funny is that it turns 
out the best way for them to get that attention is to criticize me” (Trump 2015a, 
10, 11, 14).  
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In the 2016 US presidential, the tech pundits pronounced that big data was the factor 
determining election results. So for example Wired Magazine wrote that the “mar-
riage of big data, social data will determine the next President” and summarised this 
claim in a simple formula: “Big Data + Social Data = Your Next President”64. There 
are indications that the Clinton campaign’s data spending was much higher. Data 
show that in October 2016, the Clinton campaign had raised US$ 1.3 billion, the 
Trump campaign just US$ 795 million65. The table below shows for both campaigns’ 
spending on tech and data in June 2016. According to this source, the Clinton cam-
paign not just invested a higher share of its budget on data and tech than the Trump 
campaign, but it spent 3.7 times what the Trump campaign invested. 
 






Clinton, % of 
spending 
Web development 
and digital consulting 
$2.5m 
 
3.3%   
Telemarketing and 
data 
$1.5 m 1.9% $0.2m 0.1% 
Software $0.3m 0.3%   
Data management $0.2m 0.2%   
Online advertising $0.1m 0.2% $11.6m 5.1% 
Digital consulting $0.1m 0.1% $0.7m 0.3% 
Technology services   $1.6m 0.7% 
Computers   $1.5m 0.7% 
Database services   $0.5m 0.2% 
Technology consult-
ing 
  $0.4m 0.2% 
Design and web 
development 
  $0.3 0.1% 
Voter file   $0.4m 0.2% 
E-mail services   $0.2m 0.1% 
List rental   $0.2m 0.3% 
Total $4.7m 6.0% $17.6m 8.00% 
Table 7: Campaign spending on tech and data in June 2016 (data source: Bloomberg 
Politics, https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/graphics/2016-presidential-campaign-
fundraising/july/public/index.html) 
Big data does not win and cannot predict elections. It is a techno-fetishistic myth to 
believe that the more money a campaign invests into data analytics, the larger the 
likelihood of electoral success. It is the complex combination of structural conditions, 
economic and political contradictions, crises, political subjectivities, political struc-
tures of feeling, ideological factors, organising, campaigning and communication that 
determines election results. Data, algorithms and tech form just one of many relevant 
factors. In the 2016 US presidential election, right-wing ideology trumped over big 
data politics.  
But Trump is after Narendra Modi the world’s second populist Twitter president. 
Trump uses Twitter as political spectacle. A study estimates that in the third US pres-
idential election debate, political bots posted 36.1% of the pro-Trump tweets and 
23.5% of the pro-Clinton tweets (Kollanyi, Howard and Woolley 2016). So automated 
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will-determine-the-next-president  
65 https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/campaign-finance/  
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politics played some role in the election campaign. Regularly news articles in the 
mainstream media focus on what Trump tweets. Some argue that we live in an age of 
post-truth, where not facts, themes and debate, but ideology, personalities and emo-
tions shape politics. Increasingly, what is highly visible and emotionally attractive is 
considered as truth.  
The post-truth regime means distrust in experts and established politicians and the 
replacement of arguments and evidence by pure ideology. “I, for one, am not inter-
ested in defending a system that for decades has served the interest of political par-
ties at the expense of the people. Members of the club – the consultants, the poll-
sters, the politicians, the pundits and the special interests – grow rich and powerful 
while the American people grow poorer and more isolated. […] The only antidote to 
decades of ruinous rule by a small handful of elites is a bold infusion of popular will. 
On every major issue affecting this country, the people are right and the governing 
elite are wrong. The elites are wrong on taxes, on the size of government, on trade, 
on immigration, on foreign policy” (Trump 2016c). In the Brexit campaign, Conserva-
tive politician and then Secretary of State for Justice Michael Gove said: “I think the 
people in this country have had enough of experts with organisations with acronyms 
saying that they know what is best and get it consistently wrong”66. In the 2017 Aus-
trian presidential election, right-wing candidate Norbert Hofer said about Green Party 
candidate Alexander Van der Bellen: “There is a big difference between the two of 
us: You have the high society behind you, and I have the people behind me. And 
that’s the big difference”67 (see Fuchs 2016a and 2016c for a more detailed discus-
sion of the 2016 Austrian presidential election’s political context and the use of social 
media in it). All three statements have in common that they construct a conspiratorial 
rule of the people by established politicians and intellectual and call for anti-
intellectual politics that are driven by emotions and right-wing ideology. We know to-
day that in the case of Trump the call for an anti-elitist revolution just resulted in the 
installation of members of the billionaire class as political elite.  
A study by Pablo Barberá (2015) analysed 15 million tweets mentioning Obama 
and Romney during the 2012 US presidential election: “85% of retweet interactions 
take place among Twitter users with similar ideological positions. […] Political polari-
zation is particularly intense among right-leaning Twitter users, as indicated by the 
darker shading. Although liberal users also present this pattern, they tend to engage 
more often in conversations all along the ideological spectrum” (Barberá 2015, 87). 
Barberá’s study seems to confirm that Twitter communication takes place in echo-
chambers, where users listen to, follow, like and re-tweet like-minded political points 
of view. The study also found that especially right-wingers are intolerant of positions 
and people who do not share their opinions. The lack of debate and engagement is 
also expresses as online harassment, ideological violence and anonymous threats. 
In addition, the fast speed of Twitter also discourages debate. 
Trump uses Twitter’s brevity of 140 characters for a politics that does not rely on 
arguments, but on negative emotions that he tries to stir among his followers. Twitter 
is the best-suited medium for the emotional and ideological politics of outrage, 
scapegoating, hatred, and attack because its ephemerality, brevity and speed sup-
port spectacles and sensationalism. At the same time, the custom of liking and re-
                                            
66 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGgiGtJk7MA  
67 Translation from German (CF), Original: “Es gibt einen großen Unterschied zwischen uns 
beiden: Sie haben die Hautvolee und ich hab die Menschen. Und das ist der große Unter-
schied”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YA-OHUDAXrI  
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tweeting on Twitter appeals to Trump’s narcissistic side so that he enjoys his status 
as a celebrity, brand and political leader.  
Wilhelm Reich (1972) argues that authoritarianism not just has political-economic, 
but also ideological and psychological foundations. Reich was especially interested in 
the question how authoritarian operates with emotional, unconscious and irrational 
elements and why it does so successfully. “Every form of totalitarian-authoritarian 
rulership is based on the irrationalism inculcated in masses of people” (Reich 1972, 
312). Reich shows how authoritarianism operates upon “the emotions of the individu-
als in the masses” and avoided “relevant arguments as much as possible” (Reich 
1972, 34). “Hitler repeatedly stressed that one could not get at the masses with ar-
guments, proofs, and knowledge, but only with feelings and beliefs” (Reich 1972, 83). 
Twitter is a medium that supports politics that are based on feelings, beliefs and irra-
tionality instead of arguments, proofs and knowledge. Donald Trump has made emo-
tionally laden ideological Twitter politics a key element of his political strategy. 
Club 2 was a television debate format broadcast by the Austrian Broadcasting 
Corporation ORF from 1976 until 1995. After Dark was its British equivalent. Its prin-
ciples included live, open-ended, uncensored television discussion, controversial top-
ics, invitation of 4-8 participations, a diversity of guests (including non-experts) who 
often held contradictory points of view, rotating hosts, leather couches and a coffee 
table, floor lamps, a dark studio, and no studio audience. Disagreeing positions could 
meet in a neutral space and got enough time for exchanging points of view. In the 
age of Trump, Twitter and reality TV, political communication is accelerated, very fast 
and superficial. There is no time and no space for substantial debates. What we need 
in order to save democracy is not just slow media, but also Club 2.0. 
Trump makes use of Twitter for broadcasting 140 character soundbites about what 
he likes and dislikes. Some examples.  
 
Examples of Trump’s Twitter-likes: 
 
• “Vladimir Putin said today about Hillary and Dems: ‘In my opinion, it is humiliating. 
One must be able to lose with dignity.’ So true!”, December 23, 2016 
• “Yes, it is true - Carlos Slim, the great businessman from Mexico, called me about 
getting together for a meeting. We met, HE IS A GREAT GUY!”, December 20, 
2016 
• “@BillGates and @JimBrownNFL32 in my Trump Tower office yesterday- two 
great guys!”, December 14, 2016 
• “The thing I like best about Rex Tillerson is that he has vast experience at dealing 
successfully with all types of foreign governments.”, December 13, 2016 
• “I have chosen one of the truly great business leaders of the world, Rex Tillerson, 
Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, to be Secretary of State.”, December 13, 2016 
• “Will be interviewed on @FoxNews at 10:00 P.M. Enjoy!”, December 11, 2016 
• “@TigerWoods: Can’t wait to get back out there and mix it up with the boys. –TW 
#heroworldchallenge" Great to have you back Tiger - Special!”, December 3, 2016 
• “The President of Taiwan CALLED ME today to wish me congratulations on win-
ning the Presidency. Thank you!”, December 2, 2016 
• “I am seriously considering Dr. Ben Carson as the head of HUD. I've gotten to 
know him well--he's a greatly talented person who loves people!”, November 22, 
2016 
• “Many people would like to see @Nigel_Farage represent Great Britain as their 
Ambassador to the United States. He would do a great job!”, November 21, 2016 
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• “General James ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis, who is being considered for Secretary of De-
fense, was very impressive yesterday. A true General's General!”, November 20, 
2016 
• “Jeb Bush, George W and George H.W. all called to express their best wishes on 
the win. Very nice!”, November 13, 2016 
• “Mitt Romney called to congratulate me on the win. Very nice!”, November 13, 
2016 
 
Examples of Trump’s Twitter-dislikes:  
 
• Civil rights activist and House of Representatives member John Lewis was one of 
the leaders of the 1963 March on Washington. He testified in the US Senate on 
Donald Trump’s decision to nominate Senator Jeff Sessions’ for attorney general: 
“It doesn’t matter whether Sen. Sessions may smile or how friendly he may be, 
whether he may speak to you. We need someone who will stand up and speak up 
and speak out for the people who need help, for people who are being discrimi-
nated against”68. In an interview, Lewis said he did not consider Trump as a legiti-
mate president and that “the Russians participated in helping this man get elected” 
(Todd, Bronston and Rivera 2017).  
Trump commented on Twitter: “Congressman John Lewis should spend more time 
on fixing and helping his district, which is in horrible shape and falling apart (not to 
mention crime infested) rather than falsely complaining about the election results. 
All talk, talk, talk – no action or results. Sad!”, January 14, 2017.  
• After CNN had reported on an alleged Russian dossier on Trump, Trump attacked 
the channel in a press conference and wrote on Twitter: “@CNN is in a total melt-
down with their FAKE NEWS because their ratings are tanking since election and 
their credibility will soon be gone!”, January 12, 2016. 
• “@NBCNews purposely left out this part of my nuclear quote: ‘until such time as 
the world comes to its senses regarding nukes.’ Dishonest!”, December 23, 2016 
• “If Russia, or some other entity, was hacking, why did the White House wait so 
long to act? Why did they only complain after Hillary lost?”, December 15, 2016 
• “The media tries so hard to make my move to the White House, as it pertains to 
my business, so complex - when actually it isn't!”, December 15, 2016 
• “Has anyone looked at the really poor numbers of @VanityFair Magazine. Way 
down, big trouble, dead! Graydon Carter, no talent, will be out!”, December 15, 
2016 
• “Just watched @NBCNightlyNews - So biased, inaccurate and bad, point after 
point. Just can't get much worse, although @CNN is right up there!”, December 
11, 2016 
• “Chuck Jones, who is President of United Steelworkers 1999, has done a terrible 
job representing workers. No wonder companies flee country!”, December 7, 2016 
• “Boeing is building a brand new 747 Air Force One for future presidents, but costs 
are out of control, more than $4 billion. Cancel order!”, December 6, 2016 
• “If the press would cover me accurately & honorably, I would have far less reason 
to ‘tweet.’ Sadly, I don't know if that will ever happen!”, December 5, 2016 
• “The Green Party just dropped its recount suit in Pennsylvania and is losing votes 
in Wisconsin recount. Just a Stein scam to raise money!”, December 4, 2016 
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• “Just tried watching Saturday Night Live - unwatchable! Totally biased, not funny 
and the Baldwin impersonation just can't get any worse. Sad”, December 3, 2016 
• “I thought that @CNN would get better after they failed so badly in their support of 
Hillary Clinton however, since election, they are worse!”, November 29, 2016 
• “@CNN is so embarrassed by their total (100%) support of Hillary Clinton, and yet 
her loss in a landslide, that they don't know what to do.”, November 28, 2016 
• “If Cuba is unwilling to make a better deal for the Cuban people, the Cu-
ban/American people and the U.S. as a whole, I will terminate deal.”, November 
28, 2016 
• “The Green Party scam to fill up their coffers by asking for impossible recounts is 
now being joined by the badly defeated & demoralized Dems”, November 26, 2016 
• “Fidel Castro is dead!”, November 26, 2016 
• “The failing @nytimes just announced that complaints about them are at a 15 year 
high. I can fully understand that - but why announce?”, November 22, 2016 
• “Perhaps a new meeting will be set up with the @nytimes. In the meantime they 
continue to cover me inaccurately and with a nasty tone!”, November 22, 2016 
• “I cancelled today's meeting with the failing @nytimes when the terms and condi-
tions of the meeting were changed at the last moment. Not nice”, November 22, 
2016 
• “I watched parts of @nbcsnl Saturday Night Live last night. It is a totally one-sided, 
biased show - nothing funny at all. Equal time for us?”, November 20, 2016 
• “The cast and producers of Hamilton, which I hear is highly overrated, should im-
mediately apologize to Mike Pence for their terrible behaviour”, November 20, 
2016 
• “The Theater must always be a safe and special place. The cast of Hamilton was 
very rude last night to a very good man, Mike Pence. Apologize!”, November 19, 
2016 
• “Our wonderful future V.P. Mike Pence was harassed last night at the theater by 
the cast of Hamilton, cameras blazing. This should not happen!”, November 19, 
2016 
• “The failing @nytimes story is so totally wrong on transition. It is going so smooth-
ly. Also, I have spoken to many foreign leaders.”, November 16, 2016 
• “The @nytimes sent a letter to their subscribers apologizing for their BAD cover-
age of me. I wonder if it will change - doubt it?”, November 13, 2016 
• “Wow, the @nytimes is losing thousands of subscribers because of their very poor 
and highly inaccurate coverage of the ‘Trump phenomena’”, November 13, 2016 
 
Trump’s Twitter-politics is a politics of 140 character soundbites that consist of a 
world polarised into friends and enemies. Via Twitter, Trump broadcasts news about 
how his personal friend/enemy-scheme evolves. There are two sides: The side of the 
friends, whom he characterises as great, impressive, nice, successful, and talented. 
And the side of the enemies, whom he characterises as bad, biased, failing, inaccu-
rate, dishonest, nasty, not nice, one-sided, overrated, poor, rude, sad, terrible, untal-
ented, or wrong. Trump’s politics is a world of polar opposites, in which representa-
tives of the two sides have completely opposed characteristics.  
Data scientists conducted a quantitative analysis of Trump’s tweets. They found 
that Trump tends to use language that is negative and scapegoats: “But what’s truly 
distinctive is how he uses adjectives: He combines an adjective followed by some-
one’s name a stunning 10 times more than any other candidate. This is primarily be-
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cause of his proclivity for using Twitter to launch personal attacks on specific individ-
uals, like ‘lightweight’ Megyn Kelly, ‘little’ Marco Rubio, ‘low-energy’ Jeb Bush, 
‘dopey’ Bill Kristol, etc. […] Trump is also distinctive in his use of pronouns (‘I,’ ‘you,’ 
‘he,’ ‘she,’ ‘we,’ ‘us,’ etc.). Trump uses pronouns in a very different way than the other 
candidates. ‘I’ and ‘me’ (as well as Trump’s own name) are used much more than 
other candidates. While @realDonaldTrump’s use of ‘we’ is within the range of other 
candidates’, Trump hardly uses the pronoun ‘us’ – a bit surprising for a presidential 
candidate who is expected to lead America to a ‘great’ shared future” (Tsur, 
Ognyanova and Lazer 2016). 
For Trump, Twitter is a symbolic and communicative battlefield. Carl Schmitt char-
acterised such a worldview as the friend/enemy-scheme: 
  
The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be re-
duced is that between friend and enemy […] Insofar as it is not derived from 
other criteria, the antithesis of friend and enemy corresponds to the relatively 
independent criteria of other antitheses: good and evil in the moral sphere, 
beautiful and ugly in the aesthetic sphere, and so on. […] The distinction of 
friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separa-
tion, of an association or dissociation. […] Emotionally the enemy is easily 
treated as being evil and ugly, because every distinction, most of all the politi-
cal, as the strongest and most intense of the distinctions and categorizations, 
draws upon other distinctions for support. […] The enemy is solely the public 
enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, 
particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship. 
[…] War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy. It is 
the most extreme consequence of enmity. It does not have to be common, nor-
mal, something ideal, or desirable. But it must nevertheless remain a real pos-
sibility for as long as the concept of the enemy remains valid (Schmitt 
1932/1996, 26, 27, 28, 33). 
 
For Trump, Twitter is a symbolic and communicative battlefield. Trump calls social 
media his “method of fighting back”:  “It’s a great form of communication. […] I think I 
picked up yesterday 100,000 people. I’m not saying I love it, but it does get the word 
out. When you give me a bad story or when you give me an inaccurate story or when 
somebody other than you and another network, or whatever, ‘cause of course, CBS 
would never do a thing like that right? I have a method of fighting back. That’s very 
tough. […]  I really believe that the fact that I have such power in terms of numbers 
with Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, et cetera, I think it helped me win all of these rac-
es where they’re spending much more money than I spent”69. 
Besides Twitter, also television is a very important communication medium for 
Trump. The first television debate between Trump and Clinton reached a total of 84 
million US viewers, including 18 million viewers on NBC, 13.5 million on ABC, 12.1 
million on CBS, 11.4 million on Fox News, 9.9 million on CNN, 5.5 million on the Fox 
network channels, 4.9 million on MSNBC, 2.5 million on Univision, and 1.8 million on 
Telemundo (Stelter 2016). The debate attracted the largest audience ever reached in 
sixty years of televised US presidential debates. “In November, Fox averaged 3.3 
million viewers in primetime, a 68% increase over November 2015. CNN averaged 
                                            
69 https://www.scribd.com/document/330970776/Trump-60-Minutes-
2#download&from_embed  
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1.5 million viewers, a 128% increase from last November. MSNBC attracted 1.3 mil-
lion viewers, a 98% increase. [...] Strong ratings have translated into solid profits and 
revenues. Ad revenue for cable news may reach $2 billion this year, a 15% increase 
over 2015. Media analytics company SNL Kagan predicts record-breaking profits of 
$1.67 billion for Fox News and nearly $1 billion for CNN“ (Edkins 2016). The New 
York Times saw its paid subscriptions increasing by 132,000 during a three-week 
period in November 2016, a growth rate ten times higher than during the same period 
in 2015 (Belvedere 2016).  
In the world of the capitalist spectacle, the capitalist media need Trump just like 
Trump needs the media. The mainstream media helped making Trump both econom-
ically and politically. A truly critical strategy would be to provide no free promotion to 
Trump by ignoring him. To say nothing, report nothing, and comment on nothing that 
is right-wing populist in character has to be part of breaking the right-wing spectacle’s 
spell. According to a report, NBC, CBS and ABC gave 23.4 times more coverage to 
Trump than to Sanders (Boehlert 2016). An alternative strategy also requires chang-
ing the balance of forces in media coverage. 
5.6. The Apprentice: Trumpology as Reality TV Spectacle 
The Apprentice is a reality TV-show broadcast by NBC. It featured Donald Trump as 
host and juror from 2004 until 2015. The concept of the show involves a group of par-
ticipants who want to become successful entrepreneurs and learn from Trump. They 
compete against each other by performing business tasks. Each week, Trump elimi-
nates at least one with the words “You’re fired”. In 2008, NBC also introduced the 
show The Celebrity Apprentice, in which celebrities participate. Trump created the 
media company Trump Productions for producing these shows.  
“Why do you think NBC gave me my own show, The Apprentice? They did it be-
cause I set myself apart to be a target, the big, tough employer. The result was one 
of the most successful shows in television history. I’m the only boss in the world who 
boosts a person’s future status by firing them” (Trump 2015a, 12). Trump’s image as 
combative leader and tough businessman drove audience ratings. More than 40 mil-
lion viewers watched the first season’s finale in 2004 (Carter 2004).  
NBC not just paid Trump for hosting The Apprentice, the show was also an oppor-
tunity for Trump to present and sell himself as brand. “Donald Trump built his reputa-
tion selling real estate, but the thing he had always wanted to sell was Donald Trump. 
His career as a reality television star would finally make Trump into a household 
brand – and he was determined to cash in. […] Trump Menswear made an appear-
ance, of course, on an episode of The Apprentice. So did Trump Ice, a new brand of 
water, and Trump Success, a new fragrance. Riding the popularity of the show, 
Trump licensed his name to clothes, ties, home furnishings, eyeglasses, wallets, 
even mattresses” (Kranish and Fisher 2016, 221, 224).  
I have analysed a large sample of 201 elimination scenes from The Apprentice’s 
first fourteen seasons (2004-2015) by conducting a content analysis of the scenes in 
the boardroom. The analysis focused on how Trump justifies the elimination of candi-
dates. Table 8 shows the results. The reasons for firing are summarised as ideal 
types. 
The analysis shows that the justifications that Trump used most frequently for 
eliminated contestants were that they in his opinion showed poor leadership or per-
formed poorly. The third most frequent elimination reason was that Trump thought 
candidates were weak and emotional. Taking these aspects together, it becomes 
clear that Trump in The Apprentice imagines a good businessperson to be a strong 
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and hierarchic leader, who works hard, achieves high performance measured in 
terms of success and profits, shows no weaknesses, and is tough and ruthless.  
 





“You have no 
leadership capaci-
ties!” 
95 47.3% "A stupid, impulsive, life-threatening decision. Frankly, if you are 
running a company and make that kind of decision, you destroy 
that company instantaneously" (S2E2) 
"You wouldn't step up us a leader" (S1E10) 
"I just don't think that you are a strong leader" (S3E11) 
"You were the team leader. The team was a mess. The project 
was no good. And Chris, you are fired" (S3E12). 
"Your decision making was terrible" (S4E6) 
"Lenny made a lot of mistakes. Lenny was not a good leader for 
this team. […] The leadership wasn't good" (S5E7) 
"You're not a proper leader. Amy, you're fired!" (S6E1) 
"You did a lousy job and you're a bad project manager" (S6E7) 
"But the concept was flawed and you were the project manager. 
You got killed" (S6E11) 
"You couldn't control him. You brought in no money. And you 
had a lousy looking store. You were not much of a team leader. 
[…] You are fired! You were lousy last week, lousy this week. 
We have to do it. Go!" (S8E3) 
“Your performance 
was poor!” 
73 36.3% "You lose! I do not want to take a chance on somebody who 
loses all the time perhaps" (S2E13) 
"Everybody virtually said you just did not contribute, you were 
not a go-getter"  (S2E1) 
"You are totally ineffective. You have done a terrible job" (S4E4) 
"You didn't sell. You failed" (S4E6) 
"You did not do much" (S4E7) 
"No matter which team you are on, all you do is create problems" 
(S4E9) 
"That suit is a loser. On this task, you did a horrible job!" (S6E2) 
"Alex sold the least. And Alex just does not seem to have the 
same passion as you two guys. Alex, you are fired!" (S10E2) 
"He raised no money. Gotta do it. Richard, you are fired!" 
(S11E5) 
"Deborah raised the least money of the people you brought 
back. Deborah, you are fired!" (S12E7) 
“You are no fight-
er. You are not 
tough. You are 
weak” 
11 5.5% "I hated the way you took so much crap […] To me that was a 
form of weakness" (S1E6) 
"You did not fight for yourself and you are fired" (S1E5)  
"You are not strong enough to be here, you are just not strong-
enough" (S4E12) 
"It was just too much emotion […] From a pure business point of 
view, too much emotion can also be not so good. And therefore, 
Meat Loaf, you are fired!" (S11E11) 
“You were disloyal 
to your team” 
9 4.5% "You lashed out at your project leader, which was completely out 
of line" (S2E11) 
"What I hate is that Stacey keeps going on about responsibility, 
how it is never your fault. You never take responsibility. […] You 
can't just blame the project manager when you are unsuccessful 
getting your point across" (S2E7) 
"Every single woman in this room thought you were a disruptive 
force" (S4E1) 
"Most importantly, there was a great disloyalty to your team. Lou, 
you are fired!" (S12E8) 
Candidate quits 6 3.0%  
“Your behaviour is 
unpredictable” 
4 2.0% "I just can't have a loose cannon on my hands" (S2E3) 
“The others do not 
like you” 
1 0.5% "Your teammates did not really like you too much" (S2E15) 
“The others are 
more exciting than 
you are” 
1 0.5%  
Cheating 1 0.5%  
Table 8: Frequency of Donald Trump’s justifications for the elimination of participants 
in The Apprentice (2004-2015), N=201 
The ideal manager and worker as portrayed in “The Apprentice” is a person who 
shows all features of Trumpology: possessive individualism, performance and hard 
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labour, top-down leadership, and the belief in survival of the fittest and cut-throat 
competition (Social Darwinism).  
In the boardroom scenes, Trump often uses very negatively laden terms that can 
have humiliating effects on those whom he eliminates. Typical examples are “stupid”, 
“mess”, “terrible”, “mistakes”, “not good”, “lousy”, “bad”, “flawed”, “losing”, “failing”, 
“ineffective”, “loser”, “horrible”, “weakness”, “not strong enough”, “too much emotion”, 
“unsuccessful”, “disruptive”. Such terms set up a clear binary between tough, suc-
cessful, hard-working winners and weak, unsuccessful, lazy losers. The Apprentice 
conveys a picture of society as consisting only of winners and losers with nothing in 
between. The winners are presented as strong and tough like warriors in an army. 
The soldier is the ultimate role model, on which Trumpology and The Apprentice are 
built. There is also a patriarchal dimension that uses dualisms such as strong/weak, 
rational/emotional, the leaders/the led. The model of the warrior always implies the 
possibility for war, which is present in the dimension of cutthroat competition. 
Survival of the fittest, hierarchy and performance measurement in The Apprentice 
imply that you have to make profits in order to be a winner. Those who are blamed 
for poor financial performance are therefore often eliminated: “You brought in no 
money”, "You didn't sell. You failed", “He sold the least”, "He raised no money”, “She 
raised the least money”. The unity of leadership, possessive individualism, perfor-
mance measurement and Social Darwinism is ideologically and socially aimed at the 
accumulation of money and power.  
 
Academic literature studying The Apprentice has stressed several aspects: 
 
1. Individualism: 
“The world of The Apprentice is based around an extreme individualism, where 
everyone is a master of his (or her) own destiny, to the detriment of all others. 
Trump frequently describes the – from selling candy bars to constructing ad cam-
paigns – as military operations” (Franko 2006, 255). 
“The participants represent models of conduct, to be approved or disapproved ac-
cording to extant ideological criteria of ‘the American dream’, which involves the 
prospect of individual ascent to the top irrespective of social background, and cor-
rect ‘enterprising’ business practice under neoliberal conditions” (McGuigan 2008, 
310-311). 
2. The ideology of hard labour: 
“By presenting the ‘reality’ of work and business in the form of highly structured 
entertainment, The Apprentice transforms the norms of the neoliberal workplace 
into taken-for-granted ‘common sense’” (Couldry and Littler 2011, 265).  
The “highly distinctive performance norms of neoliberal business culture are them-
selves naturalized and objectified as part of ‘the real world out there’ […] neoliberal 
norms are reified as ‘rules of the game’” (Couldry and Littler 2011, 275). 
3. Leadership:  
“Trump himself acts, without any irony, as the semi-autocratic ruler and the ulti-
mate CEO” (Franko 2006, 248).  
4. Social Darwinism: 
“The Apprentice is imbued with market values and seeks to validate the absolute 
worth of capitalist business whatever the human cost most obviously the arduous 
testing of candidates in the show in order to reveal the fittest” (McGuigan 2008, 
318). 
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The Apprentice poses questions about the relationship of play/labour, the real/the 
symbolic, co-operation/competition, consciousness/the unconscious, the real/the im-
aginary, and the real/the ideological. It is a game, in which real world participants per-
form labour as play. It is an artificial, mediated and symbolic game that is a manifes-
tation of neoliberal capitalism’s reality. It features co-operation for the sake of compe-
tition so that feelings of solidarity are subsumed under the logic of individual survival 
and competition. The show allows the audience to project their desires of success 
and their actual experiences of stress and hardship into the candidates and Donald 
Trump as leader. This projection involves both love and aggression towards particu-
lar successful and unsuccessful participants and Trump’s success, behaviour and 
aggression.  
The Apprentice’s competition between winners and losers is a mediated socio-
psychological spectacle and drama that appeals to viewers’ unconscious desires, 
fantasies and drives. The real and the imaginary life of both participants and viewers 
meet in the programme’s symbolic world that is broadcast into everyday people’s 
homes. But given the way the programme is constructed around cutthroat competi-
tion, hyper-individualism, elimination, and the ruthless firing and humiliation of the 
least successful, The Apprentice’s socio-psychological structure has a predominantly 
instrumental and ideological character. It hails the viewers as neoliberal subjects and 
tries to teach them neoliberal militancy and neoliberalism as philosophy of life. The 
Apprentice portrays reality in its neoliberal version and tries to implement this image 
as normal reality. It is of course not certain to which extent this instrumental project is 
successful because audiences are complex. But we can say that the ideological di-
mension is the key feature of The Apprentice.  
The Apprentice sets up an extremely polarised vision of society – a world, in which 
there is just one winner and all others are losers, who are on their own, are eliminat-
ed, crushed and for whom there is no mercy, solidarity or support. The Apprentice 
envisions a world of untamed, pure capitalism without a welfare state and without 
solidarity. It is a world without elements of socialism. It is an unsocial world, an inhu-
mane society. The Apprentice is not just a TV show, but also an ideological project 
that tries to normalise pure capitalism.  
The analysis shows that hyper-individualism, the ideology of performance and 
hard labour, top-down leadership, and Social Darwinism along with the friend/enemy 
distinction form key elements of Trumpology. The Apprentice reflects the elements of 
this ideology in a game show that tries to normalise and justify pure capitalism that 
lacks any elements of solidarity and social security. Imagine a society, whose political 
system is guided by the vision advanced by Trumpology and The Apprentice. In such 
a society, large parts of the welfare state and public services are privatised. It is an 
autocratic society that is governed top-down with limited possibilities for opposition. 
Law and order politics impose harsh sentences even for minor crimes. It is a highly 
armed and militarised society threatening to use its repressive capacities against 
perceived enemies. Corporate taxation is low or non-existent. Workers’ rights hardly 
exist. There is no minimum wage regulation. Trade unions have no influence on 
working conditions. There close ties between big capital and the state that advances 
monopoly capital’s interests. Culture is unitary and closed and based on a strict di-
chotomy of the nation and the foreign.  
Ideologies always have real and fictitious dimensions. It is not predetermined how 
close or distant a society governed by Donald Trump as President will come to 
Trumpology’s dystopia. The decisive question will be to which extent Trump wants to 
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and can realise elements of Trumpology in actual politics. This will depend on the 
question to which degree his policies will be guided by Trumpology and resisted by 
internal (within the Republican Party) and external forces (parliamentary opposition, 
civil society). In newspapers and on The Apprentice, Twitter and television shows, 
Trumpology presents itself in a quite frightening way. A key question is to which de-
gree President Trump will put ideology into policy, words into action, and to which 
degree he will keep up, radicalise or moderate Trumpology’s economic, political and 
ideological dimensions.  
 
6. Conclusion: Towards a Critical Theory of Contemporary Authoritarianism, 
Trumpology and Trumpism  
 
In critical theory, the leadership principle, nationalism, the friend/enemy scheme, and 
patriarchy are seen as four important feature of authoritarianism. 
The leadership principle is a first important element of authoritarianism. Theodor 
W. Adorno argues that an authoritarian leader “characteristically indulges in loqua-
cious statements about himself” (Adorno 1975, 11). We have seen in the analysis 
presented in this paper that Trumpism and Trumpology are all about Trump as brand, 
business leader and political leader. Trump’s politics and ideology are completely 
centred on himself. The reason why this strategy has made him American president 
may be that the personality cult and the identification with one person as leader re-
sponds to the “coldness, […] despair, isolation, and loneliness” (11) under which indi-
viduals suffer. “The more impersonal our order becomes, the more important person-
ality becomes as an ideology. The more the individual is reduced to a mere cog, the 
more the idea of the uniqueness of the individual, his autonomy and importance, has 
to be stressed as a compensation for his actual weakness” (11-12). Trump’s follow-
ers project their frustrations into Trump as symbol of their longing for love and hope. 
The follower, “by making the leader his ideal […] loves himself, as it were, but gets rid 
of the stains of frustration and discontent which mar his picture of his own empirical 
self” (Adorno 1991, 140). There is “identification through idealization” (140). 
The leader often presents himself as a lone wolf fighting against political elites 
(Adorno 1975, 14). This comes along with “aversion to the professional politician and 
perhaps to any kind of expertness” (21). We have seen that Trump opposed the es-
tablished political elites in the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. He culti-
vates the image of a lone wolf, who is a self-made billionaire and self-made president 
opposing career politicians. He presents himself as the prototypical winner of the 
American Dream, who by hard labour has made it to the top. The message to every-
day Americans is, “If I can make it to the top, then you can do so too!”. Authoritarian-
ism perpetuates “actually and ideologically the necessity of hard work, this obtaining 
a justification for ‘discipline’ and oppression” (Adorno 1975, 23). 
Trump’s populist, aggressive, attack-oriented, offensive, proletarian language and 
style make him appear as a great little man, who is on the top, but at the same time 
an ordinary person. The great little man is “a person who suggests both omnipotence 
and the idea that he is just one of the folks” (Adorno 1991, 142). “While appearing as 
superman, the leader must at the same time work the miracle of appearing as an av-
erage person” (141). The great little man “walks unrecognized in the same paths as 
other folks, but […] finally is to be revealed as the saviour” (Adorno 1975, 29) 
Nationalism is a second feature of authoritarianism. Demagogues try to create an 
artificial bond (Adorno 1991, 135) such as the nation. They use what Adorno calls the 
unity trick: They argue that everyone, except outsiders, is part of the nation and that 
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out-groups are threatening this unity. They make use of the logic of repressive egali-
tarianism (Adorno 1991, 146). “They emphasize their being different from the outsider 
but play down such differences within their own group and tend to level out distinctive 
qualities among themselves with the exception of the hierarchical one” (146). They 
aim at “the establishment of something utterly limited and particularistic as the totali-
ty, the whole, the community” (Adorno 1975, 58). We have seen that Trump argues 
that he will make “America great again”. He promises prosperity, wealth, and world-
wide recognition to American citizens. But he can do so only by constructing enemy 
out-groups that are seen as damaging the greatness of the American nation. By play-
ing with nationalism, Trump detracts attention from the actual class differences within 
the United States.  
Authoritarianism as its third feature makes use of the friend-enemy scheme. Na-
tionalist unity always has an outside that is portrayed as enemy: “the Communists, 
the radicals, the sceptics, and, of course, the Jews. These groups are a priori ex-
empted from such a unity; they merely threaten it and must be ‘driven away’” (Adorno 
1975, 59-60). The imagined unity is one of the “right people” (60). Right-wing dema-
gogues “cannot help feeling surrounded by traitors, and so continuously threatens to 
exterminate them” (Adorno 1975, 78). Erich Fromm (1936) characterises the authori-
tarian personality as sadomasochistic character type that feels pleasure in both sub-
mission to authority and the subjection of underdogs. Authoritarian societies would 
foster sadomasochistic personalities (117-118) Authoritarian personalities therefore 
show “aggression against the defenceless and sympathy for the powerful” (115). Au-
thoritarianism has an extremely polarised relationship to the powerful and the weak: 
“To the one group all good characteristics are ascribed and they are loved, and to the 
other group all negative characteristics are ascribed and they are hated” (116). Au-
thorities would often support and promote this dual structure in order to reach the 
double goal of on the one hand keeping the relationship to one group “free from ha-
tred and directing on the other hand hatred against forces that it wants to combat 
with the help of the subaltern” (116). 
Trump constructs out-groups such as illegal immigrants, Mexico, China, Muslims, 
oppositional politicians, and his critics. They are presented as threatening the great-
ness of the American nation. According to Adorno, identification with the leader and 
hatred against the out-group allows emotional release (Adorno 1975, 16-20). Such a 
release of aggression encourages “excess and violence” (17).  
Patriarchy plays a peculiar role in authoritarianism as its fourth feature. On the one 
hand, the male warrior, who fights and does not show emotions, is presented as the 
ideal human being that should be imitated. The “model of the military officer” is 
“transferred to the realm of politics” (Adorno 1975, 49). Love to the leader is an “emo-
tional compensation for the cold, self-alienated life of most people” (Adorno 1975, 
37). We have seen that in Trump’s world, survival, toughness, strength, and the will-
ingness to fight, lead and compete are moral norms. The “reference to love is almost 
completely excluded” (Adorno 1991, 137). The “traditional role of the loving father” is 
replaced ”by the negative one of threatening authority” (Adorno 1991, 137). 
But at the same time love to the leader is a psychological factor that allows follow-
ers to project their fears into the leader and hope for compensation. The leader 
stands for “an omnipotent and unbridled father figure” (Adorno 1991, 139). Identifica-
tion is the psychological expression of an emotional tie between the leader and a 
community that accepts this leadership (139). So whereas love is on the one hand 
excluded from politics and relegated to the realm of the family, it at the same time 
plays a key role in the identification with the leader that is love for the leader and at 
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the same time the compensation for the fear of not feeling loved by and accepted in 
society. “The desire to be loved, no matter if it is more or less conscious, and the fear 
of loss even just of the possibility to be loved are the basis for admiration and obedi-
ence” (Fromm 1936, 78). 
Franz Neumann (1957, 288-293) argues that political change in a specific direction 
can occur under the condition of the alienation of labour, destructive competition and 
political alienation. If such objective conditions are translated into feelings of social 
alienation, i.e. the collective fear by a group that “its prestige, income, or even its ex-
istence” (290) could decline, then such change becomes more likely. Neumann also 
adds that in such situations, institutionalised forms of anxiety such as demagogic 
leaders, movements and parties often bring about the transition from objective condi-
tions and subjective anxiety into political action and change.  
This paper has shown that the conditions of American capitalism have featured 
relative wage decreases resulting in the increase of capital in total wealth, costly 
technological progress, fluctuating profit rates that have spurred financialisation, capi-
tal export and de-industrialisation in an international division of labour. Political alien-
ation, i.e. the structural feeling that politicians do not represent everyday citizens, 
came along with the rising power of capital. In this situation, right-wing populists have 
institutionalised anxiety by spurring nationalism and resentments against immigrants, 
refugees, Muslim, and their opponents and critics. This means that scapegoats have 
become the subject of aggression and projected fears. The political trick is that ideol-
ogy deflects attention from the role of class and capitalism in the creation of social 
problems. The paradoxical effect is that working class voters elect a billionaire as 
president who represents the political interest of capital because the national interest 
is foregrounded against imagined enemies so that the class conflict is ideologically 
made invisible, although it continues to exist. 
Table 9 summarises dimensions of how the state and politics could look like under 
Trump’s rule.  
That a billionaire turns president means a significant change in the relationship be-
tween the state and the economy. Big capital has more opportunities to rule directly. 
The government that Trump appointed indicates the tendency of an overlap between 
the political elite and the capitalist class. One has to wait and see what this means in 
terms of concrete economic policies. The ideological and political signs certainly point 
towards an even purer and untamed capitalism than before. A key question is how 
the realm of oppositional politics and civil liberties will develop under Trump. His polit-
ical rhetoric in the election campaign and the elements of Trumpology have raised 
fears of what may happen. Threats to civil liberties pose in general a potential for the 
rise of authoritarian statism.  
Trumpism is not just a brand, a business strategy and a political strategy. Trump is 
also Trumpology, an ideology that stages itself as spectacle in public and in the me-
dia. Trumpology involves elements such as possessive individualism, the Ideology of 
hard labour, performance measurements, hierarchic leadership, survival of the fittest, 
and cutthroat competition. 
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Dimension Possible Elements of the State and Politics under 
Trump 
Relationship of the 
state to the economy  
Overlap of the political elite and the capitalist class in the 
form of a politician-turned-billionaire. There is a tendency 




• Low-tax economy with massive tax reductions for corpo-
rations and the rich 
• Protectionism (e.g. tariffs) and de-globalisation of the US 
economy. 
• State intervention in favour of big capital (oil/gas/coal in-
dustry, health care and pharmaceutical industry, private 
education, construction, etc.)  
• Private-public partnerships in infrastructure projects fea-
turing socialised financial risk and private ownership. 
• Logic of privatisation and for-profit in health care and ed-
ucation 
State institutions and 
the relationship of the 
state to citizens to the 
state  
• Law and order politics 
• Close political ties to far-right figures, friend/enemy-logic, 
revanchism (“screw them back in spades”), and insults of 
opponents have raised fears of authoritarian statism. 
• The scapegoating of immigrants and Muslims has raised 
fears of authoritarian statism.  
Inter-state relations Foreign trade: 
• Scepticism of international free trade agreements. 
• Scapegoating of other nations for socio-economic prob-
lems in the USA. 
Foreign policy: 
• Plan to build a wall between the Mexican and the US 
border. 
• Political distance and hostility towards certain countries 
such as China, Mexico, Iran, and Cuba.  
• Unilateralism 
• Politics of armament 
• Friend/enemy-scheme 
Ideology  Trumpology: 
• Possessive individualism 
• Ideology of hard labour and performance measurement 
• Hierarchic leadership 
• Social Darwinism, survival of the fittest, cutthroat compe-
tition 
A key question for the future of the US state and US socie-
ty is to which degree these ideological elements will be 
used as discourses by the state and discourses on the 
state that are put into political practice. 
Table 9: Dimensions of the state under Trump 
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For-profit mainstream media that are often (pseudo-)critical of Trump have helped to 
make him because they know that making Trump means that Trump makes them: 
The monetary and reputational profits of Trump and the for-profit mainstream media 
live in a contested, but happy symbiosis within the capitalism of the spectacle. The 
only way of overcoming this vicious cycle that has contributed to Trump’s political rise 
would be to slow down the speed of the media (slow media) and to stop giving so 
much attention to Trump. The media rather would have to give much more attention, 
space and time to the analysis and discussion of the big contradictions that society 
faces at the macro-level.  
The combination of Trump’s actual power and Trump as spectacle, showman and 
brand makes his government’s concrete policies fairly unpredictable. Franz Neumann 
in the 1950s wrote the essay Anxiety and Politics, in which he reflects on what intel-
lectuals can do in political situations, where they face threats of the rise of authoritar-
ianism. His words sound very topical in the world of 2017. Neumann argues that what 
remains is  
 
the dual offensive on anxiety an for liberty: that of education and that of politics. 
Politics, again, should be a dual thing for us: the penetration of the subject mat-
ter of our academic discipline with the problems of politics – naturally, not day-
to-day politics – and the taking of positions on political questions. If we are seri-
ous about the humanization of politics; if we wish to prevent a demagogue from 
using anxiety and apathy, then we – as teachers and students – must not be si-
lent. We must suppress our arrogance, inertia, and our revulsion from the al-
leged dirt of day-to-day politics. We must speak and write. […] Only through our 
own responsible educational and political activity can the words of idealism be-
come history” (Neumann 1957, 294-295).  
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